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BEYOND LIGHTS AND WIRES IN A BOX:




Public Television is capable of becoming the clearest
expression of American diversity, and of excellence within
diversity. Wisely supported ... it will respect the old and
new alike, neither lunging at the present nor worshipping
the past. It will seek vitality in well-established forms and
in modem experiment. Its attitude will be neither fearful
nor vulgar. It will be, in short, a civilized voice in a
civilized community.'
In 1967, Congress passed the Public Broadcasting Act (the
"Act")2 with the intention of providing diverse, balanced program-
ming for the benefit of the public at large? In 1991, various
" The title of this Article stems from a statement that Edward R. Murrow
once made about television in general: "This instrument can teach, it can
illuminate; yes, it can even inspire. But it can do so only to the extent that
humans are determined to use it to those ends. Otherwise, it is merely lights and
wires in a box." JOHN W. MACY, JR., To IRRIGATE A WASTELAND: THE
STRUGGLE TO SHAPE A PUBLIC TELEVISION SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES ix
(1974).
.. Fellow, CaliforniaAppellate Project, San Francisco, California. The author
would like to thank Stuart Robinowitz for his comments on an earlier draft of
this Article. The views expressed herein are the views of the author and do not
reflect the views of the person thanked.
ITHE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION, PUBLIC
TELEVISION: A PROGRAM FOR ACTION 18 (1967) [hereinafter CARNEGIE I].
2 Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365 (1967) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-399
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
3 See 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (purpose was
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commentators, educators, politicians and others argued that the
Act's mandate was not being followed.4 Criticisms were furiously
promotion of programs of "high quality, diversity, creativity, excellence, and
innovation"); see also ROBERT J. BLAKELY, THE PEOPLE'S INSTRUMENT: A
PHILOSOPHY OF PROGRAMMING FOR PUBLIC TELEVISION 14 (1971); S. REP. NO.
222, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1772 (stating
that the intent of the Act is to improve program quality so "this natural resource
may be used to its fullest for the betterment of individual and community life.
. . ."); S. REP. No. 222, reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1773 (major objective
was to "provid[e] a mechanism whereby programs of high quality, responsive to
the cultural and educational needs of the people, can be made available. . .
S. REP. NO. 222, reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1777-78:
[P]ublic [T]elevision must be provided with such abundant program-
ming as to offer for each local station both diversity and choice.
Although the aims of noncommercial broadcasting should be directed
toward cultural and informational programs, it should not be so highly
specialized, however, that it caters only to the most esoteric tastes.
For an exhaustive survey of the history and structure of public broadcasting
in the United States, see generally GEORGE H. GIBSON, PUBLIC BROADCASTING:
THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 1912-1976 (1977); MACY, supra
note *. For a fuller discussion of the history of Public Television and of the
Public Broadcasting Act in this Article, see infra notes 10-65 and accompanying
text.
' See discussion infra notes 94-125 and accompanying text.
Public broadcasting currently receives approximately 16% of its annual
expenditures from congressional appropriations. See Henry Morgenthau, Airwaves
for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1994, at A27. The most recent congressional
appropriations process conducted to determine the amount of funding to be
provided for Public Television for 1994 through 1996 provided an opportunity
for the voicing of criticisms of Public Television.
While the appropriations process has never been free of controversy, in 1991
the usual stir surrounding the process took on a new cast. See MARILYN
LASHLEY, PUBLIC TELEVISION: PANACEA, PORK BARREL, OR PUBLIC TRUST? 15-
16 (1992) (noting how articles highlighting the problems of Public Television
usually appear around the time for hearings on reappropriation). The traditional
criticisms of programming content for being either too liberal, too controversial,
or too focused on the tastes of the upper-middle class were harsher than those of
previous years. See id. (noting that harsh criticism produced some of the "most
far-flung headlines ever penned" with regard to Public Television); see also Kit
Boss, Public TV Too Liberal, Say Conservatives, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 5, 1992,
at L8 (noting "[w]hile criticism of PBS is not new, the climate surrounding it is,"
according to public broadcasting executives and media observers). Additionally,
critics contended that in the face of an increasingly advanced technological
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levelled at Public Television, yet the invective subsided when
Congress eventually voted to reauthorize funding for Public
Television through 1996.' Recently, however, the doors were
opened to a new round of debate when Lewis H. Lapham wondered
"what PBS [The Public Broadcasting Service] 6 would look like if
it attempted to do what it was intended to do."7
How can PBS effectively do what it was intended to do? It is
this question that fuels the discussion that will take place in this
Article. This Article argues that critics of Public Television, like
Lapham and various members of Congress, miss the point. The
issue is not whether Public Television, per se, is unnecessary, even
in light of a changing technological world. The proper starting
point for discussion is that Public Television in its current form is
ineffectual and will remain so unless the manner in which the
medium is funded is significantly altered. The focal point of any
debate on Public Television should not be its disutility in light of
technological developments, or the controversial or politically
liberal content of its programming. The focus should be on how
Public Television's hands are tied by the source of its funding.
When Congress passed the Public Broadcasting Act, its goal
was for Public Television to serve as an alternative to the fare
society, Public Television was no longer a necessary part of the broadcasting
landscape. See discussion infra note 96 and accompanying text.
' In August 1992, Congress authorized $310 million for Public Television
for fiscal year 1994, $375 million for fiscal year 1995, and $425 million for
fiscal year 1996. Public TelecommunicationsAct of 1992, Pub. L. 102-356, 106
Stat. 951 (1992).
Public Television is forward funded by two years, therefore, funds
appropriated for a particular year provide financing for that year and give the
current estimates for two successive years. See, LASHLEY, supra note 4, at 65
n.1.
6 For a fuller discussion of the Public Broadcasting Service, see infra note
60 and accompanying text.
' Lewis H. Lapham, Adieu, Big Bird: On the Terminal Irrelevance of Public
Television, HARPER'S MAG., Dec. 1993, at 43 (Lapham was the host of
Bookmark, a series that aired on PBS from 1989-91). Lapham's question is an
oft-repeated one. Since its inception, commentators, educators, politicians and
others have questioned the role of Public Television in the day-to-day lives of
those for whom it was created-the American public. See discussion infra notes
62-65 and accompanying text.
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offered on commercial television-fare which for the most part did
nothing to expand the minds of the American public-and as a
medium which would transform and surpass the then-stagnant
offerings on noncommercial television. 9 The attainment of this goal
8 See H. REP. No. 572, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in 1967
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1801 (regarding need for legislation, presidents of each of the three
major commercial networks noted that "economic realities of commercial
broadcasting do not permit widespread commercial production and distribution
of educational and cultural programs which do not have a mass audience
appeal."). CBS President Dr. Frank Stanton noted that because the networks
"have to serve the greatest number of people in order to do [their] job, [Public
Television] will be able to do special interest kinds of programming that [the
networks] can't do." Id. at 1807.
A colloquy that took place during the hearings on the Act illustrates the
dissatisfaction with commercial broadcasting and the hope that Public Television
would "serve the interests in education, culture, good sense, and good taste" that
were not being served by commercial television:
Senator [Norris] Cotton [New Hampshire]: I don't know whether
you gentlemen have had time to listen to television, but, I think it is
perfectly sickening. It is far below the standard of my mind, many of
the programs I get commercially ....
Secretary [John] Gardner [Department of Health, Education and
Welfare]: One of the major objections to commercial television today
is that it is something of a straitjacket, and perhaps necessarily so in
the nature of the medium . . . . Because [commercial broadcasting is]
appealing to a very large audience, they try to find a common
denominator and that does limit choices.
RONALD A. CASS, REVOLUTION IN THE WASTELAND: VALUE AND DIVERSITY IN
TELEVISION 34-35 (1981) (quoting Subcomm. on Communications, Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Hearings on S. 1160, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 53-54 (1967))
(alterations added).
9 See THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC
BROADCASTING, A PUBLIC TRUST 9 [hereinafter CARNEGIE II] (1979) ("Public
broadcasting was conceived as a major new national institution, an ambitious
concept that would transcend the limited fare, centered principally on public
education, offered by several hundred non-commercial television and radio
stations then in existence.").
In making the distinction between Public Television and instructional
television, Congress noted that "[p]ublic broadcasting is that system which may
be utilized to provide educational, cultural, and discussion programs which serve
the general community. . . ." S. REP. No. 222, reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1782. Instructional television was designed "primarily to provide in-school
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is restricted by the current funding scheme.
This Article focuses on three areas. First, this Article examines
past attempts on the part of the legislative and executive branches
of government to control Public Television through their hold on
its purse strings. Second, in a First Amendment context, this Article
analyzes congressional attempts to control the content of Public
Television programming. Finally, out of a belief that debates about
the content of Public Television programming and the utility of
Public Television in the face of technological developments are
actually means of avoiding the ultimate kernel of the controversy
over Public Television-funding--this Article presents a suggestion
for alternatively funding Public Television which may make Public
Television less of a point of controversy when it is again time to
argue for refunding the system.
Before engaging in an examination of the issues presented
above, a look at the history of the Act is necessary.
I. THE PUBLIC BROADCASTING ACT OF 1967
The purpose of public broadcasting is to enhance the quality
of our dreams.'
[P]rograms of high quality, diversity, creativity, excellence,
and innovation, which are obtained from diverse sources,
will be made available to public telecommunications entities
11
To understand fully the nature of the most recent debate over
Public Television, it is necessary to look to the congressional intent
behind the creation of Public Television, as well as to the problems
that Congress's specific statutory mandate generated.
instruction and formal education material to students in accredited or recognized
schools." Id.
10 BLAKELY, supra note 3, at 37.
" 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A).
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A. The Report of the Carnegie Commission on Educational
Television
In 1965, the Carnegie Corporation of New York awarded a
grant to form the Carnegie Commission on Educational Television
(the "Commission").12 The Commission was given a year and a
half to investigate the status of educational television and to publish
a report of its findings and advice. 3 In 1967, the Commission
published Public Television: A Program for Action, a book
containing these findings and recommendations regarding the
viability of a national educational television system.' 4 The
Commission stated that it had reached the conclusion that the
United States was in need of "a well-financed, well-directed
educational television system" in order to meet the complete needs
of the American public. 5 According to the Commission: "The
firm base upon which educational television is founded, and the
potentiality it possesses to serve the general welfare, warrant the
investment of public funds and public energies; the public interest
in its expansion is unmistakable ....""
Although the Commission's name and mission indicate that it
was to focus specifically on the preexisting educational television
system, 17 the Commission separated educational programming into
12 See GIBSON, supra note 3, at 123.
13 See GIBSON, supra note 3, at 123.
14 See CARNEGIE I, supra note 1.
"5 See CARNEGIE I, supra note 1, at 3.
16 See CARNEGIE 1, supra note 1, at 3 (omission in original).
7 Although noncommercial radio broadcasting had been in existence since
the early 1920s, the major stimulus for noncommercial television broadcasting
came in 1952, when Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")
Commissioner Frieda B. Hennock fought for and won the reservation of
television channels for educational stations. See THE RESEARCH AND POLICY
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, BROADCASTING
AND CABLE TELEVISION: POLICIES FOR DIVERSITY AND CHANGE 46-47 (1975)
[hereinafter BROADCASTING & CABLE TELEVISION]. During the 1950s,
educational broadcasting-supported by state and local taxes, private contribu-
tions, and foundation funding-grew slowly; however, such support was not
enough. ld. at 47.
PUBLIC TELEVISION 139
two parts: instructional television, television to be used in the
general formal educational setting, and what the Commission called
"Public Television," television aimed at the community-at-large,
and chose to deal primarily with Public Television.18 To illustrate
In 1962, after one year of debate, Congress amended the Communications
Act of 1934 to allow federal funds to be used to help the development of
educational television. See id; ANTHONY SMITH, THE SHADOW IN THE CAVE:
THE BROADCASTER, His AUDIENCE, AND THE STATE 221 (1973). The
Educational Television Facilities Act of 1962 ("ETFA") authorized $32 million
in matching grants to be awarded by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare over a five-year period, for the construction of educational-television
stations. See SYDNEY W. HEAD, BROADCASTING IN AMERICA: A SURVEY OF
TELEVISION AND RADIO 379 (2d ed. 1972); see also BROADCASTING & CABLE
TELEVISION, supra, at 46. The EFTA included a proviso that no single grant was
to exceed the amount of $1 million. SMITH, supra, at 220.
This legislation represented the first direct federal aid to noncommercial
television broadcasting, although the effort had previously received indirect
federal funds through a variety of educational assistance programs like the
National Defense Act of 1958, which provided up to $110 million to "encourage
and improve" the teaching of certain subjects with some of this money going
toward research and experimentation on instructional television. HEAD, supra, at
212, 213 n.48. The ETFA was also important because it placed for the first time
a responsibility at the national level for improving the quality of television
broadcasting. SMITH, supra, at 220; HEAD, supra, at 378.
The ETFA helped to activate 92 new stations and expand 69 existing
stations. HEAD, supra, at 212. By the end of 1966, 126 educational-television
stations were on the air. CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 34. By 1968, 156 stations
had been activated. HEAD, supra, at 212.
IS CARNEGIE I, supra note 1, at 2, 3; see also MACY, supra note *, at 23.
The Commission's suggestion was to establish a noncommercialtelevision system
that would have a broader view than the old educational concept. See HOWARD
J. BLUMENTHAL & OLIVER R. GOODENOUGH, THIS BUSINESS OF TELEVISION 39
(1991); see also HEAD, supra note 17, at 213 n.49 (noting that the Carnegie
Commission described the image projected by educational television service as
"somber and static").
The Committee for Economic Development noted that "perhaps the most
visible change [with regard to educational television] resulting from the report
was the introduction of the term public television." BROADCASTING & CABLE
TELEVISION, supra note 17, at 47; see also CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 35 ("A
new term, 'public television,' was introduced to dramatize the emphasis on
programming for general enrichment and information, as well as for classroom
instruction.").
The Commission chose to concentrate on Public Television based on the
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the difference between instructional television and Public
Television, the Commission discussed three types of television:
commercial television, instructional television and Public
Television.
Commercial television was described as television which "seeks
to capture the larger audience" and relies primarily on that
audience's desire to be entertained.' 9 Instructional television is
television which calls upon society's predisposition to "work, build,
learn, and improve., 20 According to the Commission, instructional
television "asks the viewer to take on responsibilities in return for
a later reward., 21 If viewed on a continuum, commercial tele-
vision and instructional television would lie at opposite ends.22
Along this continuum, Public Television would lie somewhere in
the middle, as it encompasses "all that is of human interest and
importance which is not at the moment appropriate or available for
support by advertising, and which is not arranged for formal
instruction."'23
In the Commission's eye, Public Television was to be "a system
that in its totality will become a new and fundamental institution
in American culture."24 The Commission wrote:
[S]ince the technology of television lends itself readily to
uses that increase the pressure toward uniformity, there
must be created means of resisting that pressure, and of
enlisting television in the service of diversity. We
belief that it "both require[d] and [was] ready for immediate action." CARNEGIE
I, supra note 1, at 3. Additionally, "[tihe [Clommission believed that noncom-
mercial television could do more than instruct its viewers; it could serve the
larger public good." BROADCASTING & CABLE TELEVISION, supra note 17, at 47.
This Article, like the Commission's report, focuses on Public Television, as
opposed to strictly educational television.
'9 CARNEGIE 1, supra note 1, at 2.
20 CARNEGIE I, supra note 1, at 2.
21 CARNEGIE I, supra note 1, at 2.
22 See CARNEGIE I, supra note 1, at 2.
23 CARNEGIE I, supra note 1, at 2. The programming presented on Public
Television was not to be for the classroom, nor was it to be economic for
commercial sponsorship, and its audience could range from the tens of thousands
to the tens of millions. CARNEGIE 1, supra note 1, at 3.
24 CARNEGIE I, supra note 1, at 4.
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recognize that commercial television is obliged for the
most part to search for the uniformities within the general
public, and to apply its skills to satisfy the uniformities it
has found. Somehow we must seek out the diversities as
well, and meet them, too, with the full body of skills
necessary for their satisfaction.25
The Commission believed that television had to more fully
serve not only the mass audience, but the numerous audiences that
formed the fabric of American society.26 To this end, the
Commission presented several proposals for the creation of a viable
Public Television system that would "appeal to excellence in the
service of diversity."27
The Commission recommended, inter alia, that Congress create
a federally chartered, nonprofit, nongovernmental corporation
authorized to receive and distribute governmental and private funds
for the expansion and improvement of programming.28 This
corporation, called the Corporation for Public Television, would,
among other things, support the production of Public Television
programs by local stations for "more-than-local" use through
appropriate grants and contracts, support research and development
and technical experimentation to improve program production, and
25 CARNEGIE I, supra note 1, at 13-14.
26 CARNEGIE I, supra note 1, at 14.
27 CARNEGIE I, supra note 1, at 14. The Commission felt that "until
excellence and diversity have been joined, we do not make the best use of our
miraculous instrument." CARNEGIE I, supra note 1, at 14; see also CASS, supra
note 8, at 33 ("The Carnegie view was that noncommercial broadcasting should
provide the public at large with broadly educational and cultural programs that
would raise the general level of taste and understanding. In other words, the
Commission wanted to create a mechanism for making publicly available the sort
of valuable and diverse programming commercial television could not or would
not provide."); BROADCASTING & CABLE TELEVISION, supra note 17, at 46-47
("The promise of greater quality, diversity, and choice in television programming
was publicly proclaimed in 1967 by the Carnegie Commission on Educational
Television . . . . One of the report's key contributions was its emphasis on
diversity in programming.").
28 CARNEGIE I, supra note 1, at 5; see also MACY, supra note *, at 22;
Kathy Gregolet, Comment, FCC v. League of Women Voters: Freedom of Public
Broadcasters to Editorialize, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 573, 575 (1985).
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provide means to recruit and train technical, artistic and specialized
personnel.29 The corporation, to be comprised of a twelve-member
board of directors,3" would "exist to serve the local station but
[would] neither operate it nor control it."'" The Commission
considered the creation of this corporation to be "fundamental to its
proposal" and went as far as stating that it would "be most
reluctant to recommend the other part of its plan unless the
corporate entity is brought into being."32
Other major recommendations made by the Carnegie
Commission included the establishment of a tax on the sale of
television sets in order to generate "increased, stable, and insulated
funding" for the activities of the proposed corporation;33 establish-
ment by the corporation of interconnection facilities that would
allow for the simultaneous broadcast of programs across the
29 CARNEGIE I, supra note 1, at 5-8; see also MACY, supra note *, at 22-23.
30 CARNEGIE 1, supra note 1, at 37. The 12 members of the board would be
"distinguished and public-spirited citizens, of whom six will be initially
appointed by the President of the United States with the concurrence of the
Senate, and the remaining six initially elected by those previously appointed."
CARNEGIE I, supra note 1, at 37. After these initial appointments, one-third of
those members appointed by the president and one-third of those elected by the
other members of the board would serve two-year terms, with the president
appointing two members every two years for six-year terms, and the entire board
electing two members every two years for six-year terms. CARNEGIE I, supra
note 1, at 37. The board was to appoint its own chairman and a full-time chief
executive officer. CARNEGIE I, supra note 1, at 38.
In appointing and electing members of the board, the president and the
board were to choose those who would provide broad representation of the
various regions of the country, various professions, and "the various areas of
talent and experience appropriate to this enterprise." CARNEGIE I, supra note 1,
at 38.
31 CARNEGIE I, supra note 1, at 5.
32 CARNEGIE I, supra note 1, at 5.
33 CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 36. The Commission's goal was to "free the
Corporation to the highest degree from the annual governmental budgeting and
appropriations procedures: the goal we seek is an instrument for the free
communication of ideas in a free society." CARNEGIE I, supra note 1, at 8. The
tax was to begin at two percent and rise to a ceiling of five percent, with the
revenues to be made available to the Corporation through a trust fund. CARNEGIE
I, supra note 1, at 8.
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nation;34 distribution of federal funds in support of general
operations to stations by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare ("HEW");35 and federal funding of a facilities program
through HEW to extend Public Television service nationwide.36
The Commission's recommendations found a great supporter in
President Lyndon B. Johnson. In his January 1967 State of the
Union address, Johnson stated: "We shall develop educational
television into a vital public resource to enrich our homes .... We
should insist that the public interest be fully served through the
public's airwaves. 37 Johnson presented the Commission's recom-
mendations to Congress. 38  In 1967, Congress took the
Commission's recommendations to heart, drafting and subsequently
passing the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 (the "Act").39
34 CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 36.
35 CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 36.
36 CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 36.
37 MACY, supra note *, at 25; see also S. REP. No. 222, reprinted in 1967
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1774 ("Noncommercialtelevision today is reaching only a fraction
of its potential audience-and achieving only a fraction of its potential worth.
Clearly, the time has come to build on the experiences of the past 14 years, the
important studies that have been made, and the beginnings we have made.")
(remarks of President Johnson in his message to Congress recommending
legislation).
38 MACY, supra note *, at 25. Commentators have suggested that President
Johnson's support for the public broadcasting medium came from his desire to
maintain consensus (or at least the appearance thereof) during the Vietnam
period. See ERIK BARNOUW, TUBE OF PLENTY: THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN
TELEVISION 398 (2d rev. ed. 1990); DOUGLAS KELLNER, TELEVISION AND THE
CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY 201 (1990). After the Act was passed, Johnson even
chose Frank Pace, Jr. a former Secretary of the Army and a former chief
executive officer of General Dynamics, to chair the new corporation created by
the Act. BARNOUW, supra, at 398-99. Upon assuming his position, Pace stated
that he had already commissioned research into how Public Television might be
used for riot control. BARNOUW, supra, at 399.
39 Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365 (1967) (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. §§ 390-399 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). The recommendations in the
Carnegie Commission report are widely acknowledged as providing the basis for
the Act. See, e.g., BROADCASTING & CABLE TELEVISION, supra note 17, at 47;
BLUMENTHAL & GOODENOUGH, supra note 18, at 40; CASS, supra note 8, at 34
("When the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 emerged... the basic thrust of the
Carnegie Commission's report had been transformed into law.").
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B. The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967
Although the basic beliefs that informed the Commission's
report were embodied in the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967,
some of the Commission's recommendations were modified,
reflecting presidential and congressional response to public debate
and pressure from pre-existing noncommercial broadcasters and
other interested groups.4" The resulting legislation differed from
the Commission's recommendations in several respects.
First, while the Commission recommended that station operating
funds be provided through HEW and that the proposed corporation
deal only with programming, research, interconnection and other
functions, Congress concluded that stations should receive operating
support from the corporation to insulate them from any pressures
that might be applied by a government agency such as HEW 4
Second, bowing to pressures from television set manufacturers
and those in both Congress and the Johnson administration who
saw the imposition of a tax on the sales of television sets as "rigid
and regressive," rather than provide funds through a tax on the
sales of television sets, Congress resolved to provide annual
appropriations to the corporation, as if the corporation were a
governmental agency.
42
Third, fearing the establishment of a "fourth network,"
Congress rejected the Commission's proposal that the corporation
40 CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 36.
41 CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 37.
42 CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 37; see also HEAD, supra note 17, at 332.
Yet the Act made it clear that the Corporation "[would] not be an agency or
establishment of the United States Government." 47 U.S.C. § 396(b) (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992).
At first, the Act only provided for annual appropriations for the Corporation
with a presidential promise to develop another plan for long-term, insulated
funding. CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 37; see also HEAD, supra note 17, at 213.
This lack of a definite funding scheme would later pose problems for Public
Television. See BLUMENTHAL & GOODENOUGH, supra note 18, at 40-41
(discussing Nixon administration's veto of funding for Public Television).
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operate interconnection facilities, and prohibited the corporation
from doing so.43
Finally, whereas the Commission did not consider public radio
broadcasting, Congress made radio and television companions in
the new federally supported system." Therefore, rather than
calling the new corporation the Corporation for Public Television,
as the Commission had suggested, Congress-to illustrate the
inclusion of radio in the new system-named the new entity the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting (the "CPB" or the
"Corporation").45
Although Congress recognized the Commission's most
fundamental proposal through its creation of the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting,46 the proposal was not incorporated into the
Act unchanged. Several of the Carnegie Commission's recommen-
dations with regard to the creation of a corporation whose primary
mission would be to "extend and improve Public Television
programming"'" were altered by Congress when it created the
41 CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 37. The idea that Public Television might
become a national fourth network surfaced frequently during the early days of
its inception. See CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 41; BROADCASTING & CABLE
TELEVISION, supra note 17, at 47; GIBSON, supra note 3, at 153; Hearings on
H.R. 6376, Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967),
reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1832 ("It would be in order.., to strengthen
and clarify the language which refers to the limitations on the powers of the
Corporation, particularly as it refers to networking .... The possibility that the
Corporation could emerge as the high mogul of a new nationwide network
should be specifically laid to rest.") (minority views of Representatives Samuel
L. Devine, James T. Broyhill, James Harvey, Albert W. Watson, Tim Lee Carter
and Clarence J. Brown, Jr.).
After Public Television became a working reality, the specter of "The
Fourth Network" was raised again by Nixon administration officials displeased
with the anti-administration bias they believed existed in public broadcasting. See
GIBSON supra note 3, at 175. The impact of the Nixon administration on Public
Television is discussed infra at notes 69-93 and accompanying text.
44 CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 37. The ETFA was also extended for three
years, this time making radio eligible for matching grants as well. HEAD, supra
note 17, at 213; CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 37-38.
41 CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 37.
46 See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
47 CARNEGIE I, supra note 1, at 5.
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Corporation for Public Broadcasting.
For example, under the Act, the Commission's recommendation
that the Corporation's board of directors be composed of twelve
members, six of whom would be initially appointed by the
president with the remaining six elected by those previously
appointed,48 was modified by Congress to create instead a fifteen-
member board with all members to be presidential appointees
subject to confirmation by the Senate.49 Moreover, as a result of
this modification, the idea of a board composed of both government
appointees and private citizens became one of a board composed
entirely of government appointees, thereby creating a closer tie
between the federal government and Public Television than was
intended by the Commission.5 ° Additionally, as noted above,
Congress fundamentally altered the Commission's proposals with
regard to the sort of functions the Corporation would serve.
The Corporation's principal role was to be the distribution of
the annual congressional appropriation to Public Television stations
" See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
49 CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 37. The Act did, however, attempt to
protect the Corporation from political control or influence of a partisan nature
by mandating that no more than 8 members of the 15-member board were to
come from the same political party. 47 U.S.C. § 396(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV
1992). Yet this attempt was criticized by the second Carnegie Commission:
[T]he Corporation's ability to carry out its broad mandate depended
greatly on the quality of the presidential appointments made to its
board. Unless the board members were capable of nonpolitical
leadership.. .the system might well falter. This objective was not
appreciably advanced by a legislative requirement that a bare majority
of the board be drawn from one political party.
CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 41 (emphasis added). The Commission's criticisms
were borne out by the partisan nature of future appointments to the Board. See
LASHLEY, supra note 4, at 36, 39 (noting that Richard Nixon appointed ten
allegedly highly partisan members and that Ronald Reagan made highly partisan
appointments to the Board in return for campaign support).
In 1981, the Board was reduced to 10 members, of which no more than 6
could be members of the same political party. Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. XII
§1225(a)(1), 95 Stat. 726 (1981). In 1992, the membership of the board was
further reduced to 9 members, of which no more than 5 could be of the same
party. Pub. L. No. 102-356 §5(a), 106 Stat. 949-50 (1992).
'0 See BLUMENTHAL & GOODENOUGH, supra note 18, at 40.
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and producers.5 1 To this end, as an entity established to foster a
strong and effective system for public broadcasting,52 it was given
responsibility for receiving and distributing federal and nonfederal
funds, for the production and distribution of national programming,
and for channelling funds toward the development of local and
regional programs.53
Among the purposes and activities of the Corporation, the Act
lists encouraging the development of a wide range of program
suppliers and maintaining high-quality program standards,54
assuring balanced reporting on controversial topics,55 making
contracts and grants for production of programs,5 6 nurturing new
station development,57 conducting research and training 8 and
establishing and maintaining a program archive. 9 Additionally,
the Corporation was charged with assisting in the task of intercon-
necting stations in a network that would allow the stations to
See BLUMENTHAL & GOODENOUGH, supra note 18, at 40 ("In reality, CPB
is mainly an entity that finances new program development and production [and]
pays for station activities. .. ."); see also A. FRANK REEL, THE NETWORKS:
How THEY STOLE THE SHOW 157 (1979) (CPB was designed to channel a
"modest" amount of federal funds into the public broadcasting system).
Congress authorized $9 million to support the CPB for fiscal year 1967-68.
HEAD, supra note 18, at 380.
52 See 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(10) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) ("[A] private
corporation should be created to facilitate the development of public telecom-
munications .... ."). As a matter of policy, Congress declared: "[L]t is necessary
and appropriate for the Federal Government to complement, assist, and support
a national policy that will most effectively make public telecommunication
services available to all citizens of the United States. . . ." 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(7)
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
11 BROADCASTING & CABLE TELEVISION, supra note 17, at 47.
14 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (CPB is to facilitate full development of
broadcasting in which programs of high quality, obtained from diverse sources,
will be made available to noncommercial broadcast stations).
15 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (in its facilitation of programming, CPB would
have "strict adherence to objectivity and balance in all programs or series of
programs of a controversial nature.").
56 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(2)(B) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
5 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(C) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
8 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(2)(G) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
'9 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(2)(D) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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program and schedule in accordance with local desires, as well as
to broadcast programs nationally.6"
60 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(B) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (CPB was to assist in
setting up network interconnection so that all stations that wished to could
broadcast programs at times chosen by the stations.).
The Public Broadcasting Service ("PBS") was the 'network' that the Public
Broadcasting Act required the Corporation to create. Because CPB was
congressionally prohibited from interconnecting the stations on its own, it
established a study group consisting of station managers, executives from the
CPB, and members of the Ford Foundation. In 1970, based on the recommenda-
tions of this study group, PBS was created. CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 38-39.
Based on the recommendations of the study group, CPB established PBS as
a membership organization that would be financed by CPB, but controlled by the
stations themselves through a governing board that would also include
representatives of CPB, the National Educational Television and Radio Center
and the public. CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 39.
PBS was viewed as the stations' organization. In addition to operating the
congressionally mandated interconnection, PBS's function was to select, schedule
and promote programs for Public Television stations, as well as to promote and
schedule programming nationally. CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 39. (PBS began
distributing programs to stations in 1970); see also BROADCASTING & CABLE
TELEVISION, supra note 17, at 47; REEL, supra note 51, at 157 (noting that PBS
was established as a programming agency for group of some 260 public
television stations); CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 57. Each station, however, was
to retain its own autonomy. REEL, supra note 51, at 158; CARNEGIE II, supra
note 9, at 57 (noting that PBS does not control stations' schedules). PBS does
not produce its own programming. BLUMENTHAL & GOODENOUGH, supra note
18, at 41.
This retention of autonomy is based on support for the concept of
"localism," a term which one commentator has called "shorthand" for enhanced
station autonomy and discretion. See LASHLEY, supra note 4, at 51. Another
commentator has stated: "Local programming should be inviolate, untouchable,
sacrosanct, protected by law . .. ." Marvin Kitman, Public TV's Shame,
NEWSDAY, June 23, 1991, at 23; see also S. REP. NO. 222, reprinted in 1967
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1778 ("[I]t should be remembered that local stations are the
bedrock of this system .... ).
Broadcasting policy based on a concept of localism seeks to provide a
diverse array of communities with stations that are responsive to the needs of
those communities. See DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG ET AL., REGULATION OF THE
ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA 157-58 (2d ed. 1991). Through FCC licensing and
spectrum allocation policies, each community should have one or more broadcast
stations of its own. Id.
The concept of localism has frequently affected broadcasting law. See, e.g.,
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Although the Carnegie Commission had the chance to see its
suggestions put into effect, the resulting system was much different
than the one that the Commission had proposed. The variance from
the Commission's proposal would ultimately lead to clashes over
how the nascent system should be funded, and based on the content
of its programming, whether it should be federally funded at all.
These two issues will be discussed later in this Article,61 yet it is
important to first note that even before any programming ever aired
on Public Television, questions with regard to its content were
raised.
C. Questioning the Purpose of Public Television
Although the tone surrounding the passage of the Act could
generally be described as optimistic and enthusiastic,62 there was
not a lack of dissent with regard to the establishment of Public
Television. The articulated purpose and goals of the new system
did not go unquestioned. The minority views of several congress-
men expose the doubts held by some with regard to the utility of
Public Television.
Representatives Samuel L. Devine, James T. Broyhill, James
Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Quincy
Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1169 (1986) (both cases striking down "must-carry" rules requiring cable
operators to carry local broadcast signals); see also GINSBURG ET AL., supra, at
388-89; PATRICK PARSONS, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 71-
73, 116-117 (1987). The validity of must-carry rules included in the 1992 Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act was recently considered by
the U.S. Supreme Court. See Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445
(1994), vacating, 819 F. Supp. 32 (D. D.C. 1993) (considering issue of whether
must-carry rules set forth in §§ 4 and 5 of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. §§ 534, 535 (Supp. IV
1992), are consistent with First Amendment; finding that must-carry rules are
content-neutral and thus not subject to strict scrutiny). For a more detailed
discussion of the concept of localism with regard to Public Television, see infra
notes 74-90 and accompanying text.
61 See infra notes 69-125 and accompanying text.
62 See, e.g., CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 38 (noting that enactment of the
Act was "the most important event in the history of noncommercial broadcast-
ing"; Act "dramatized the promise of public broadcasting .... ").
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Harvey, Albert W Watson, Tim Lee Carter and Clarence J. Brown,
Jr. contended that "Public Television seems to be very much like
the elephant being described by three blind men, each of whom felt
a different part of the animal., 63 They also compared the backers
of the legislation to "a small boy who is so anxious to have a new
toy that he would rather have a less than satisfactory one than wait
until Monday morning for the stores to open., 64 It was this
anxiety and lack of forethought that worried the members of the
minority. They believed that those who favored the passage of the
Act were willing to overlook the problems inherent in the cobbled-
together compromise which the Carnegie Commission's report had
become.
Additionally, the minority members attacked the articulated goal
of the Act in establishing a Public Television system, namely its
provision of a diverse slate of "different" programming. The
minority stated:
[Public Television] appears to be the spur which has
brought forth ... this bill. An oversimplified definition
would call this phase "cultural uplift." It is visualized by
its most enthusiastic supporters as the great and overshad-
owing element in noncommercial broadcasting. It will be
the highbrow answer to mundane commercialism. It will
sparkle, it will soar, it will also sear and singe. It will be
a force for social good (as ... [its] enthusiasts see the
social good).. . . It could, and in the opinion of some...
should, and will crusade. We know that we are not alone
in feeling some misgivings about creating a mechanism for
the kind of broadcasting which might result from ambitions
such as these.65
63 Hearings on H.R. 6376, Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1831.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1831-32. The minority would have preferred the commitment of
more resources and support to instructional television which, in their view,
involved the use of radio and television to "take the carefully prepared and
approved classroom material into the classroom under the aegis of the
appropriate educational system." Id. at 1831. In addition, the minority believed
that "other educational broadcasting"-in their view, a concept more difficult to
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Therefore, before a single word had been uttered through the
new medium of Public Television and before there was actually any
"content" to be criticized, the seeds of contention over Public
Television's content were sown. These initial apprehensions over
the fare presented on Public Television would come to be echoed
throughout the years of its existence, and with more force due to
the fact that after 1970, there was actual programming to be
criticized.
The following section focuses on the criticisms levelled at
Public Television after it began offering programming, and the
actions taken against the medium on the basis of the type of
programming offered.
II. THE GOVERNMENT ATTACKS PUBLIC TELEVISION
The only sharpness in Public Television's image is one that
we believe is unfortunate. It is (still) considered elitist...
educational, and appealing more to those with an above
average education.66
The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 is unnecessary,
inefficient, inequitable, and subject to dangerous political
influences. But perhaps I do not mention its worst feature.
It is a striking example of what is coming to be a common
situation, in which the educational community sets itself
apart from the rest of humanity.
67
define than instructional television but apparently including "mostly course
material to be presented in the home for credit or improvement of specific
skills"-should have received increased attention. Id. According to the minority,
"[t]he good to be accomplished by a great expansion of this type of broadcasting
[was] boundless . . . ." Id.
66 Harold Mendelsohn, The NeglectedMajority: Mass Communications and
the Working Person, in TALKING BACK: CITIZEN FEEDBACK AND CABLE
TECHNOLOGY 24, 36 (Ithiel de Sola Pool ed., 1973) (quoting 1970 national
survey conducted by Louis Harris and Associates for the CPB).
61 SMITH, supra note 17, at 226 (quoting Ronald H. Coase).
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I have watched . . . "Listening to America" with Bill
Moyers. If you ever saw propaganda or imbalance, that is
it.68
This section illustrates that the issue at hand in the recent
debates over reappropriating funds for Public Television was not
solely where funding for Public Television should come from, but
also who has the right to define the political culture of the nation.
This section begins with an examination of how political maneuver-
ing has held Public Television hostage in the past.
A. Public Television and the Nixon Era
As noted above, President Johnson's provision of an initial
annual appropriation for Public Television, with a promise to
determine methods of long-term funding at a later date, laid the
foundation for future difficulties encountered by the budding
system.69 The complications engendered by Johnson's fateful
omission became evident during the presidency of Richard Nixon.
Although the press-both broadcast and print-and the branches
of American government have not traditionally been known for
their harmonious relationship,"0 the relationship between the press
and the Nixon administration was especially acrimonious. Begin-
ning in 1970, the Nixon administration waged a war against
televised news on the basis that it felt the administration was being
treated unfairly and that newscasts were increasingly biased against
the administration.71 Vice President Spiro Agnew was the "chief
68 138 CONG. REc. S7430 (daily ed. June 3, 1992) (remarks of Sen. Robert
Dole).
69 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
'0 See, e.g., FRED POWLEDGE, THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION AND THE
PRESS: THE ENGINEERING OF RESTRAINT 5 (1971). Powledge describes the
relationship between the press and the government as "an elaborate game." Id
The government's role in this game is to provide only the information it wants
to provide, while the press's role is to not accept this information at face value
and to dig deeper beneath the surface of the information presented. Id. at 4-5.
71 See GIBSON, supra note 3, at 170; see also POWLEDGE, supra note 70, at
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spokesman" in the administration's intense efforts to intimidate and
harass broadcasters.72
Public Television did not escape the jaundiced eye of the
administration. In fact, because of its newness and its dependence
72 GIBSON, supra note 3, at 170; see also KILLING THE MESSENGER: 100
YEARS OF MEDIA CRITICISM 64 (Tom Goldstein ed., 1989) (describing Agnew
as Nixon's "point man against the press") [hereinafter KILLING THE
MESSENGER]; POWLEDGE, supra note 70, at 6. Agnew made a series of speeches
in which he blasted the news media. A 1969 speech given in Des Moines, Iowa
in which Agnew attacked the news media for its commentary on President
Nixon's speech on Vietnam, is viewed as the speech that began the vice
president's assault on the press. See POWLEDGE, supra note 70, at 8. Agnew
argued that "nowhere in [the American] system were there fewer checks on vast
power" than where the television news medium was concerned. Spiro Agnew,
Speeches on the Media, in KILLING THE MESSENGER, supra, at 66. Additionally,
this vast power was concentrated in the hands of a small "fraternity" whose
views "[did] not represent the views of America." KILLING THE MESSENGER,
supra, at 69. While stating that he was "not asking for government censorship
or any other kind of censorship," Agnew subtly threatened the broadcast press
by mingling his scathing criticisms with a recognition that the networks
"enjoy[ed] a monopoly sanctioned and licensed by government." KILLING THE
MESSENGER, supra, at 69-70. Various commentators criticized Agnew's speech
as being "disgraceful, ignorant, and base"; an "unprecedented attempt to
intimidate a news medium which depends for its existence upon government
licenses"; "an appeal to prejudice"; and "one of the most sinister speeches I have
ever heard made by a public official." KILLING THE MESSENGER, supra, at 74
(Agnew recounting the effect of his Des Moines speech in a subsequent speech
given in Alabama). In subsequent speeches, one given a week after the Des
Moines speech, and another given two years later in Boston, Agnew criticized,
respectively, East Coast newspapers-particularly The New York Times-and
CBS' broadcasting of several public affairs programs, including one criticizing
the Department of Defense. See KILLING THE MESSENGER, supra, at 73-85 (full
text of Alabama and Boston speeches).
President Nixon was not an innocent party to these attacks. A memorandum
from the deputy director of White House communications regarding the
administration's attempts to "shot-gun[] the media and anti-administration
spokesmen on unfair coverage" noted "21 requests from the President in the last
30 days requesting specific action relating to what could be considered unfair
coverage." WILLIAM EARL PORTER, ASSAULT ON THE MEDIA 244 (1976)
(Memorandum from Jeb Magruder to H.R. Haldeman); see also KILLING THE
MESSENGER, supra, at 64 (noting that Nixon himself edited Agnew's 1969 Des
Moines speech); POWLEDGE, supra note 70, at 6 (noting Nixon's "reluctance" to
put a stop to the assaults on the media).
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
on federal funding, Public Television was even more vulnerable to
attack than the established and advertiser-supported networks. Clay
T. Whitehead, as the director of the Office of Telecommunications
Policy ("OTP"), was responsible for leading the attacks on public
broadcasting.73  Publicly, Whitehead's assault against Public
Television was founded upon a belief in grassroots localism and a
concern for what the administration viewed as the local broad-
casting stations' loss of programming control.74
In official statements, administration officials noted that the
Public Broadcasting Act had emphasized the need for local
production and control, and asserted that Public Television had
abandoned this concept of localism and was attempting to create a
fourth national network through increasingly centralized program-
ming and scheduling functions performed by CPB and PBS.75 For
example, Whitehead voiced several concerns with the state of
public broadcasting. First, he asserted that the independence of
local stations suffered at the hands of CPB which was not devoting
" Whitehead has been called "the Agnew of public broadcasting." See
GIBSON, supra note 3, at 171.
The OTP was established in 1970 as an executive agency to manage the
broadcast spectrum and provide direct oversight of national telecommunications
policy. See LASHLEY, supra note 4, at 34. Yet by 1971, the OTP had become so
heavily involved in Public Television policy that its general counsel, now U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, drafted a proposed, long-term financing
bill for the medium. See LASHLEY, supra note 4, at 34.
74 See GIBSON, supra note 3, at 171. As illustrated by Vice President
Agnew's attacks on the power of the commercial network system, the Nixon
administration desired to minimize the control of networks in general in favor
of control at the local level. Whitehead, without making specific reference to
Public Television, reinforced this aim in a 1972 speech where he called the
placing of broadcasting power and responsibility at the local level a "uniquely
American principle" and stressed "the need for more local responsibility" since
"[t]his kind of local responsibility is the keystone of our private enterprise
broadcast system operating under the First Amendment protections." Speech by
Clay T. Whitehead, Director of the Office of Telecommunications Policy, in
PORTER, supra note 72, at 301.
75 See GIBSON, supra note 3, at 174; CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 41-42;
LASHLEY, supra note 4, at 51 (noting that OTP staff loudly proclaimed that
"public broadcasting was centralizing its forces and that the individuality of local
stations was not being recognized on a national level.") (citation omitted).
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enough to local support and local production.76 Second, he
believed that the autonomy of the local stations was undercut by
the power held and exercised by CPB and PBS. 77 Third, he stated
that there was not enough of a "proper balance" between local and
national programming or, between cultural, entertainment, news,
public affairs and educational and instructional programming.78
The latter part of Whitehead's final concern betrays the true goal
of the OTP's attack against Public Television. While outwardly
basing its criticisms upon a concern for the "unique American
principle" of localism, the office was actually concerned with the
content of Public Television programming, and specifically, Public
Television programming that seemed to have an anti-Nixon
slant.79
Whitehead fought to redirect CPB funds away from producers
who provided "objectionable programs" to local stations.80 The
text of a memorandum from Whitehead to White House Chief of
Staff, H.R. Haldeman, illustrates the tactics that the OTP used, and
planned on using, to exert pressure on Public Television.
Whitehead, discussing the recent hiring of newsmen Sander
Vanocur and Robert MacNeil, informed Haldeman of "what we are
76 GIBSON, supra note 3, at 180.
77 GIBSON, supra note 3, at 180.
7& GIBSON, supra note 3, at 180. Balance in this context appears to refer to
the range of programming offered by Public Television. See GIBSON, supra note
3, at 180.
79 See, e.g., BARNOUW, supra note 38, at 447 (noting that White House
observers of Public Television were angered by the content of the series The
Great American Dream Machine, and also outraged by Who Invited US? and
Behind the Lines, programs that addressed the government's interventionist
foreign policy and the FBI's use of its agents to discredit anti-war groups).
80 See LASHLEY, supra note 4, at 51. The president also expressed his
"unhappiness over [the] development of public TV." See LASHLEY, supra note
4, at 51; see also Jeffrey P. Cunard, Note, Freeing Public Broadcasting From
Unconstitutional Restraints, 89 YALE L.J. 719, 733 n.91 (1980) [hereinafter
Freeing Public Broadcasting] (citing October 1971 White House memorandum
indicating that the "President's basic objective" was "to get the left-wing
commentators who are cutting us up off Public Television at once, indeed
yesterday if possible") (citation omitted).
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doing behind the scenes on the Vanocur/MacNeil situation."'" For
example, Whitehead told Haldeman that stories discussing how the
newsmen's "obvious liberal bias would reflect adversely on public
television" had been planted in the press.8 2 Following the planting
of these stories, the OTP began to "encourage speculation about
Vanocur and MacNeil's salaries," eventually leading CPB
President, John Macy, to release the figures to Representative
Lionel Van Deerlin.8' Whitehead next planned to "continue to call
attention to balance on public television" and to "encourage station
managers throughout the country to put pressure on ... CPB to
balance [its] programming or risk the possibility of local stations
not carrying these programs. "84
The Nixon administration's campaign did not prevent Congress
from passing a two-year, $155 million authorization for CPB in
1972. 85 Once the authorization reached the Oval Office, however,
it was vetoed by President Nixon 6 in a veto message penned by
Whitehead. 7 In this message, Nixon deplored the fact that CPB,
S CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 44 n.10 (citing memorandum to H.R.
Haldeman, Nov. 24, 1971).
82 CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 44 n. 10.
83 CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 44 n. 10. This tactic had an obvious impact.
During the 1972 set of hearings on re-funding Public Television, Representative
Richard H. Ichord stated:
And when one is discussing the Public Broadcasting System in general,
I must say that I was aghast to discover that it was paying the very
handsome salary of 85,000 dollars-twice what Congressmen and
Senators earn-to one Sander Vanocur to impose his special slants and
prejudices on the PBS news operation. If the PBS continues to utilize
congressionally appropriated funds to directly or indirectly smear the
operations of Congress, I assure you that I can hardly be persuaded to
continue to vote approval of these funds.
SMITH, supra note 18, at 224 n.18 (citation omitted).
84 CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 44-45 n. 10.
85 CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 43.
86 CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 43; see also LASHLEY, supra note 4, at 50;
GIBSON, supra note 3, at 185.
87 See GIBSON, supra note 3, at 185. The New York Times later reported that
Whitehead had proposed a deal that funding would be exchanged for balanced
programming. See Freeing Public Broadcasting, supra note 80, at 733 n.91
(citing 1974 New York Times article) (citation omitted).
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originally intended as a creature for the service of the local stations,
had become a power center and focal point for control of the entire
public broadcasting system.8" He then stated that the question of
financing for public broadcasting could not be resolved "until the
structure of public broadcasting was more firmly established, and
we have a more extensive record of experience on which to
evaluate its role in national life."89
88 See Freeing Public Broadcasting, supra note 80, at 733 n.91; see also
CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 43 (stating that Nixon cited evidence that public
broadcasting "was deserting the concept of localism").
89 GIBSON, supra note 3, at 185; see also CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 43
(reporting Nixon's assertion that "until the industry could return to this basic
mission [i.e., localism], long-term funding was unwise.").
Observers were quick to note that the president's stated basis for vetoing the
authorization-his support for localism-was merely a screen for his displeasure
with Public Television's programming. See GIBSON, supra note 3, at 185 (noting
that the press was quick to highlight Whitehead's previously expressed belief that
public money should not be spent on controversial views). Representative Robert
0. Tiernan stated that the purpose of the veto was to prevent aggressive coverage
of Nixon's bid for reelection and to turn the electronic media to the
Administration's own ends. GIBSON, supra note 3, at 185-86. Representative
Torbert H. MacDonald claimed that one need only look to the efforts on the part
of Whitehead and to Nixon's eventual veto for an illustration of how political
pressure could be applied to reduce Public Television to a bland and cowering
medium; the administration's record with regard to Public Television, he
asserted, was one of "implied or direct threats, promises and divisive tactics."
GIBSON, supra note 3, at 186.
The comments of Patrick Buchanan, then a White House speech writer,
evinced the goals of the president and the administration in vetoing the
authorization. Appearing on the Dick Cavett Show in early 1973, Buchanan
stated:
[W]hen [the congressional authorization] came down to the White
House, we took a look at it, and we also looked at the situation over
there .... [I]f you look at the public television, you will find you've
got Sander Vanocur and Robert MacNeil .. .Sander Vanocur is a
notorious Kennedy sycophant ... and Robert MacNeil who is anti-
administration. You have the Elizabeth Drew show on, . . . she
personally, is definitely not pro-administration. I would say anti-
administration. Washington Week in Review is unbalanced against us,
you have Black Journal, which is unbalanced against us ... you have
Bill Moyers, which is unbalanced against the Administration. . . . Mr.
Nixon, I'ri delighted to say, hit that ball about 450 feet down the right
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Nixon's veto, combined with the tension among PBS, CPB and
the local stations that had resulted from discussions about localism,
led to considerable upheaval for Public Television.9" Yet it also
led to multiyear federal funding that was meant to strengthen public
broadcasting's ability to engage in long-range planning and to
secure public broadcasting's insulation from political pressures. 9'
In 1975, President Gerald Ford signed legislation that provided for
congressional authorization of funds for CPB three years in
advance, as opposed to the year-by-year process which had led to
field foul line ... and now you've got a different situation in Public
Television.
CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 43 n.8.
After the veto, many programs criticized by the administration were either
canceled or toned down. LASHLEY, supra note 4, at 50.
90 The confluence of criticisms of the role of local stations and the Nixon
veto led to shakeups within the public broadcasting structure. Three particular
actions taken by the CPB board led to a major reorganization of PBS. First,
except for one program, CPB voted to discontinue funding of all public affairs
programming; second, CPB rescinded a commitment to provide multiyear
funding to the National Public Affairs Center for Television; and third, the board
voted to take certain functions, including programming functions, away from
PBS. CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 45-46. This led PBS to reorganize to
consolidate the power of the individual stations. CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at
46; see also BLUMENTHAL & GOODENOUGH, supra note 18, at 41.
In 1973, leaders of PBS and CPB reached an agreement (the "partnership
agreement") designed to reestablish the disintegrated relationship between the two
entities. CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 46. The partnership agreement provided
that PBS would continue to operate the interconnection on behalf of its member
stations under the direction of its station-controlled board; CPB would leave to
PBS's station members the financing of programming, promotion, public
information, research, and representation; and, while CPB was allowed to make
all final decisions about programs financed through its TV activities department,
CPB staff would consult on program decisions with the programming staff at
PBS. CARNEGIE 11, supra note 9, at 46-47. Importantly, the partnership
agreement established a significant increase in CPB's discretionary funds to
stations. CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 47. This increase in discretionary funds
led President Nixon to pass a two-year, $110 million authorization in 1973,
praising the bill for furthering the cause of localism. CARNEGIE II, supra note 9,
at 47.
9' See CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 51 (noting that multiyear funding was
supposed to be an arrangement "that would be stable, long-term, and insulated.").
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problems during the Nixon administration.92
The events of the Nixon era illustrate the profound effect that
disagreement with the content of Public Television programming
can have on the medium. The Nixon administration's assault
against Public Television, culminating in Nixon's 1972 veto, not
only led to a softening of the programming aired, but threatened
the very survival of public broadcasting.93
Although multiyear funding was initiated to insulate Public
Television from political pressure, as the recent appropriations
debate illustrates, discontent with the content of Public Television
programming is still a threat to the safety of the medium; multiyear
funding did not spell the end of Public Television's problems with
regard to the content of its programming.
B. A Question of Content, 1991-1992
The tone of the 1991-92 congressional debates over refunding
Public Television in many ways echoed that of the Nixon
administration's campaign against Public Television over twenty
years earlier. Although critics of the medium offered arguments
that Public Television was elitist,94 that many of the programs
92 See CARNEGIE II, supra note 9, at 51.
93 See LASHLEY, supra note 4, at 52.
94 See, e.g., George Will, Public TV Is Just Another Middle-Class
Entitlement, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 23, 1992, at A19 (asserting that
audiences for Public Television are largely "affluent, educated, and articulate"
and the medium was therefore "another middle-class entitlement"). Apparently,
such accusations of elitism did not fall on deaf ears. During the Senate debate
over the passage of the reauthorization bill, Senator Trent Lott echoed Will's
sentiment when he contended that public broadcasting was watched and heard
more by the rich than the poor and stated: "[This] clearly amounts, for the most
part... to an upper-middle-class entitlement program." 138 CONG. REC. S7401
(daily ed. June 3, 1992); see also Martin Tolchin, Public Broadcasting Wins
Senate Battle for Federal Money, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1992, at Al (noting that
New York Senator Daniel Moynihan countered by asking whether Senate was
aware of viewing that went on in poorer, minority sections of cities) [hereinafter
Battle for Federal Money]. For an answer to the charges of elitism, see Fred W.
Friendly, Letters to the Editor, Call to Privatize Public TV Defies Reason, N.Y.
TIMES, May 18, 1992, at A16 (noting that although one of the arguments against
Public Television is that it is elitist, more than half of its viewing households
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offered on Public Television were "indecent,"95 and that Public
Television was obsolete due to the emergence of cable televi-
sion,9 6 these complaints barely veiled the true nature of Congress'
earn less than $40,000 a year, and a third earn less than $20,000).
" Critics were especially offended by Tongues Untied, a documentary
chronicling the lives of Black homosexuals, which aired in the summer of 1991
as part of the Public Television series P. O. V. North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms
cited Tongues Untied as a program which "blatantly promoted homosexuality as
an acceptable life style" and included "homosexual men dancing around naked."
138 CONG. REc. S2655 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1992); see also Martin Tolchin, Public
Broadcasting Bill is Sidelined, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1992, at A14 [hereinafter
Sidelined]. On the day the reauthorization bill was passed by the Senate, Senator
Lott mentioned Tongues Untied, noting that CPB "still had not learned its lesson"
since it planned to show The Lost Language of Cranes, a program about the
relationship between a father, who had not come to terms with his homosexual-
ity, and his son. See Battle for Federal Money, supra note 94. Senator Lott stated
that the show was one "that's going to horrify a lot of Americans." See Battle
for Federal Money, supra note 94.
The final version of the reauthorization bill passed by Congress contained
an amendment introduced by Senator Robert Byrd that restricted "indecent"
public and commercial television and radio broadcasts to between midnight and
6 a.m., unless the station went off the air at midnight, in which case broadcasts
could begin at 10 p.m. Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-356, § 16(a), 106 Stat. 954 (1992). Byrd stated that he was increasingly
disturbed by "the smutty language, violence and lack of morality" in many
television programs. Daniel Cerone, Broadcasters Hit Senate Limit On 'Indecent
Programming,' L.A. TIMES, June 5, 1992, at F24. Although the Byrd Amend-
ment was eventually declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, see Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 11 F.3d
170, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding § 16(a) of the Public Telecommunications
Act of 1992 unconstitutional), at the FCC's request, the court has since ordered
a rehearing of the case and the original decision has been vacated. See Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, 15 F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
96 Laurence Jarvik, a scholar at the conservative Heritage Foundation in
Washington, D.C. stated: "Many cable stations carry the education and cultural
programs that it was once thought could be provided only by Public Television."
See Walter Goodman, Pull the Plug on PBS?, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 22, 1992, at 33
[hereinafter Pull the Plug]. Jarvik called the public broadcasting system
"obsolete, overly expensive and doomed to be the center of continuous political
controversy." Id; see also Noel Holston, No Question About It, PBS Should
Remain, STAR TRIB., May 5, 1992, at 5E (noting that PBS' detractors argue that
it no longer deserves government support because cable channels-particularly
Discovery, A&E, and Nickelodeon-have rendered it obsolete); Bill Carter,
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Conservatives Call for PBS to Go Private Or Go Dark, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 30,
1992, at A l (illustrating overlap between elitism and new technology arguments,
conservatives argue that cultural programs similar to those shown on PBS are
available on several cable channels and audience for PBS is made up of elite and
affluent who ought to be able to afford cable to view these programs) [hereinaf-
ter Private or Dark]; Ed Siegel, A Few Words In Defense of Public
Broadcasting, BOSTON GLOBE, May 12, 1992, at 58 (asking if Public Television
is "superfluous" because of cable, where profusion of same quality programming
could be found on cable's channels) [hereinafter Words in Defense].
Although this argument is seemingly the most viable (and therefore the most
dangerous) argument against Public Television, the critics who weighed in with
this observation disregarded the fact that cable still is not available everywhere
and that many cannot afford to pay for cable. See Morgenthau, supra note 4, at
A27 (noting that argument is "shortsighted" because although fee-based
telecommunications may be "the wave of the future ... there will always be
large numbers of people who would be hard-pressed to pay for such services");
Holston, supra (asserting that following critics' logic, public libraries should be
abolished since every town has a bookstore; just as everyone cannot afford a $20
hardcover copy of a book, everyone cannot afford the $20 or more per month for
cable service); see also Walter Goodman, A Running Debate About Public TV,
N.Y. TIMEs, May 18, 1992, at C18 [hereinafter Running Debate] (noting that
cable is not free and a lot of homes are not "hooked in"); Carter, supra (PBS
executives state that relying on cable for the kind of programming provided by
PBS would disenfranchise many of the poor and minority groups the service was
intended to reach); Newton N. Minow, Perspective on Television; Much Vaster,
Still Mostly a Waste; Technology Has Brought Us an Explosion of Choice, but
Has Failed to Turn the Wasteland Into a Promised Land, L.A. TIMES, May 9,
1991, at B7 (noting that cable had expanded vastly, but choice through cable
comes at a price not all can afford and cable is not available to entire nation) (as
chairman of the FCC in 1961, Minow coined a description of television as a
"vast wasteland."); Rob Deigh, Letters to the Editor, Public TV: For the
Public-All of It, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1989, at C6 (cable is available only to
those who can pay for it and who live in areas that make it available; about 55%
of American households subscribe to cable while Public Television is universal
and reaches 98 0/--for free) (Deigh was director of Corporate Information for the
PBS in Washington, D.C.). One commentator noted that it was elitist to infer that
only those who can afford cable should be able to view quality programming.
Words in Defense, supra (noting that half the country still does not want or
cannot afford cable). Despite optimism that a recent cut in cable rates would lead
"'a large portion of the public' to see a drop in cable rates," see Elizabeth
Kolbert, F. C. C. Orders Cuts in Cable T. V Rates of 7% on Average, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 1994, at Al, the inability of many Americans to afford cable is most
likely not lessened by the cut in rates. In fact, an earlier attempt to adjust rates
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discontent with Public Television: liberally slanted public affairs
programming.97
led to some consumers observing a rise in the amount of their bills. See James
Barron, Cable TV Formula Raises Some Rates, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1993, atAl
(noting that who saved and who paid depended on where customer lived and
what cable service customer used). One commentator notes that we live in a time
when the cost of new technologies "threatens to widen the gulf between the
information 'haves' and 'have-nots."' Morgenthau, supra note 4 (suggesting that
gulf could be narrowed by public broadcasting).
Additionally, more choice may not necessarily entail better choices. See
Minow, supra (enlarged choice does not satisfy the public interest; originality is
an endangered species); see also Running Debate, supra ("upscale" channels are
not as enterprising as Public Television and their quality is not as high); Holston,
supra (debatable whether "richness and range" of PBS are surpassed by cable;
PBS is only national network hospitable to often "critical or angry outsider[]"
documentarians who attempt to say something no one else on television is saying,
which is perhaps why PBS was in trouble); Private or Dark, supra (noting that
PBS executivesrespond to criticisms by stating their overall mix of programming
is not matched elsewhere); Pull the Plug, supra (question is whether what cable
produces is up to standards of such PBS staples as Frontline, Nova, and The
MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour, and even if it was, the extent to which such quality
would be ruined "in the usual annoying fashion" by "chopp[ing the programs]
up by commercials").
Proponents of this criticism also seemed to forget that cable television is just
as market-driven as commercial television, and therefore has little incentive to
provide many of the programs provided by PBS. See Walter Goodman, In the
Debate Over PBS, the Subject Is Objectivity, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1992, at C20
(diversity brought to television by cable is not good substitute because cable
channels are controlled by market and do not begin to match Public Television
offerings); see also Running Debate, supra (noting inability or unwillingness of
commercial television to deliver programs like Frontline, Nova, and The
MacNeil/LehrerNewshour); Andrea H. Retzky, Letters to the Editor, Cable Can't
Take the Place of Public Television, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1992, at A28 (stating
that cable would already be competing in this market if educational programming
were considered commercially viable).
" This does not mean that the other arguments against Public Television are
not worth considering. However, because of their strong resemblance to attacks
made by the Nixon administration, and the dangers of such attacks, only the
accusations of liberal bias will be addressed here.
Additionally, the tenor of the debate over Public Television indicated that
the expression of these concerns merely masked the political animus that actually
fueled the assault on Public Television. See Pull the Plug, supra note 96; see
also Running Debate, supra note 96 (stating that title of May 12, 1992 Nightline
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The struggle to reauthorize funding for Public Television started
in the House of Representatives, where a federal authorization of
$275 million for 1994 was approved in November, 1991.98
Meanwhile, in the Senate, a group of Republican senators led by
Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole 99 placed a hold on the
legislation during the final hours of the last session before
Thanksgiving, 1991, just before the Senate was to vote on the
bill.' ° It was not until January, 1992 that Dole's office contacted
Senate Democrats, the Senate Commerce subcommittee, or PBS
officials to explain what was happening.' An aide to Senator
Dole noted that the senators involved in the hold saw the authoriza-
tion process as an opportunity to express their concerns with the
status of Public Television. 2 These concerns were with the
program featuring debate between Bill Moyers and George Will recognized the
essence of the discussion, namely the attack from the right on PBS for its skew
to the left; title of program was Conservatives Trying To Kill Off Public
Broadcasting); Private or Dark, supra note 96 (illustrating that it was not until
later in the debate that charges evolved into a suggestion that PBS was no longer
a necessary or worthwhile source of programming because cable offered same
programming); Boss, supra note 4 (noting that despite "flap" over Tongues
Untied, PBS programs were mostly being attacked not for their alleged
indecency, but for their supposed political bias).
9' See Private or Dark, supra note 96.
99 Dole has been opposed to public broadcasting since its inception and was
an opponent of the original 1967 Act that created the system. See Sharon
Bernstein, PBS Vows to Take Offensive Against Critics, L.A. TIMES, June 25,
1992, at FI [hereinafter Offensive Against Critics].
10 See Sharon Bernstein, Senate Stalls PBS Money, Blames 'Bias,' L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 1992, at Fl [hereinafter Senate Stalls]. The hold was secretly
placed on the bill as a tactical move meant to prevent the bill from being
discussed. See Sharon Bernstein, Public Broadcasting Braces for a Fight, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 1992, at FI [hereinafter Fight].
... Senate Stalls, supra note 100.
102 Senate Stalls, supra note 100 (Republican senators stated that they would
not release the hold until public broadcasting officials responded to their
concerns).
This view was expressed during the debates over the passage of the original
Public Broadcasting Act of 1967. See Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. FCC, 521 F.2d
288, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("[I]f... we have occasion to feel that there is
slanting, a bias, or an injustice, we instantly and immediately can do something
about it"; Congress "can make very uncomfortable, and give a very unhappy
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alleged "liberal bias" the senators perceived as running rampant
throughout Public Television." 3
Prior to the reauthorization hearings, conservative organizations
like the Heritage Foundation and the Committee on Media Integrity
had been part of a carefully administered assault on Public
Television aimed at exposing "its left-wing propensities.'
0 4
Awareness of the Republican hold on the reauthorization legislation
came amid a flurry of activity against Public Television by these
conservative organizations.' °5 Apparently, Senate Republicans
were influenced by the various reports and attacks issued by
various conservative groups, as several of the Republican senators,
including Dole, expressed a concern over what they perceived as a
experience to, the directors of [CPB]" and "can shut down some of their
activities in the Appropriations Committee and in the appropriating process of
Congress") (quoting remarks of Senator Norris Cotton) (citation omitted); Id.
("Ultimately Congress may show its disapproval of any activity of the
Corporation through the appropriation process" and that through its "control over
the 'purse strings,' Congress reserved for itself the oversight responsibility for
the Corporation").
"03 See Fight, supra note 100 (reporting that a top Dole advisor stated that
the senator was concerned that public broadcasting was too liberal and that Dole
was supporting efforts to stall funding for that reason).
"o See Private or Dark, supra note 96 (noting that since November, 1991
Public Television had come under a well-organized attack by conservative
organizations who charged that public affairs programming on the system
exhibited what they called a "liberal tilt"); see also Offensive Against Critics,
supra note 99 (noting that David Horowitz, the leader of the Committee on
Media Integrity, took credit for beginning the push against Public Television and
was soon joined by Laurence Jarvik of the Heritage Foundation); Walter
Goodman, Documentaries That Lean Left, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1991, at C13
[hereinafter Lean Left]; see also Pull the Plug, supra note 96 (discussing
Horowitz and the Committee for Media Integrity); Senate Stalls, supra note 100
(noting that Horowitz had been actively lobbying Dole and other senators about
what he perceived as a leftist bias in public affairs programming). Horowitz
stated, "Conservatives and Republicans, who represent a majority of the
electorate, feel very alienated from Public Television." Boss, supra note 4.
Horowitz likened PBS to "a vanity press for the Democrats." Boss, supra note
4.
'05 See, e.g., Senate Stalls, supra note 100 (reporting Heritage Foundation's
release of a report in January, 1991 calling for the abolition of government
support for Public Television).
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lack of balance in public broadcasting." 6 Eerily paralleling the
actions of the Nixon administration of over twenty years before, a
highly-placed GOP source said that Senate conservatives might try
to keep a tighter rein on public broadcasting by changing the way
it was funded from the multiyear system put into place in 1975, to
a system that would be funded for only one year at a time."0 7 If
successful, the conservatives would trigger a return back to the
uncertainty that marked Public Television's existence during the
Nixon era.
Senate Democrats recognized the Republicans' actions less as
a call for balanced programming than an attempt to force public
broadcasting to toe the Republican administration line."0 ' An
additional impetus for the senators' attack on public broadcasting
was their fear of what the medium would say about them. As one
public broadcasting executive noted, "One element of this is that
politicians themselves have discovered the power of television. If
you want to control the way we understand the world, you'll want
to circumscribe the ways we present it."' 9
In February, 1992, Senator Dole refused a request from Senate
Majority Leader George Mitchell asking that the authorization bill
106 See, e.g., Senate Stalls, supra note 100. Horowitz later credited his claims
that public broadcasting officials received excessive pay for getting the Senate's
attention as much as the claim that public affairs programming was biased to the
left. Sharon Bernstein, CPB Funding Bill Faces Compromise, L.A. TIMES, May
16, 1992, at F1 [hereinafter Compromise].
107 Senate Stalls, supra note 100.
'0' See Senate Stalls, supra note 100; see also William J. Eaton & Sharon
Bernstein, GOP Senators Blast Public Broadcasting, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1992,
at A8 (noting that Democratic defenders of Public Television believed that "GOP
ideologues" wanted to force a "right-wing agenda" onto the public airwaves).
One commentator later noted that PBS' Frontline had done more than any other
program to expose the wrongdoing that took place in the Reagan administration
and that this was the real reason for the attack against Public Television. Words
in Defense, supra note 96.
109 Boss, supra note 4 (quoting John Schott, executive director of the
Independent Television Service). Arthur Kropp, the president of People for the
American Way, a group that supports freedom of expression, noted: "[I]mages
are very powerful, particularly when public officials are scared to death about
getting defeated." Boss, supra note 4.
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be allowed to come to the floor for a vote."' Mitchell then acted
to force a vote to override Dole's refusal, which would lead to the
bill being introduced on the Senate floor."' Senate Democrats
managed to force the bill to the floor, but on March 4, 1992, faced
with threats of the introduction of a flurry of amendments that
would affect the bill, they pulled the bill from the Senate floor." 2
Senator Dole continued his criticisms of Public Television for
its liberal bias. The day before Senate Democrats pulled the bill
from the floor, Dole posed the following question to the Senate:
"[C]an anyone stand on this floor and claim that public broadcast-
ing is not liberal?""' 3 He criticized PBS' choice of political
commentators for the presidential elections stating, "[W]hen PBS
announced its coverage of the 1992 presidential elections would be
handled by Bill Moyers ... and William Greider, two excellent
journalists who also happen to be two excellent liberal Democrats,
I knew the fix was in."'"
4
By April, Dole and Senator Daniel Inouye, the chairman of the
Senate Commerce subcommittee that oversees Public Television,
.10 See Fight, supra note 100.
"' Fight, supra note 100. The Senate voted 87-to-7 for cloture, a procedure
that removed the hold on the bill. See Public Television, Radio Funding, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 1992, at B4.
112 See Sidelined, supra note 95 (noting that threatened amendments,
including an effort to attach an unrelated anti-crime bill as an amendment,
appeared to be so cumbersome that the bill's backers chose temporary retreat);
see also Compromise, supra note 106.
Additional threatened amendments included one which would have required
public disclosure of salaries paid to CPB executives and to some of the
performers who appear on Public Television programs. Sidelined, supra note 95.
In this regard, it seems as if Senate Republicans had studied at the knee of OTP
chief Clay Whitehead who used similar tactics to undermine Public Television
for the Nixon administration. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text
(discussion of Whitehead's memorandum to H.R. Haldeman addressing salaries
of newsmen Sander Vanocur and Robert MacNeil).
113 138 Cong. Rec. S2645 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1992); see also Sidelined, supra
note 95.
114 138 Cong. Rec. S2645 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1992). Dole also stated that he
had "never been more turned off, and more fed up with the increasing lack of
balance, and the unrelenting liberal cheerleading I see and hear on the public
airwaves." Id; see also Private or Dark, supra note 96.
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were reported to be meeting with each other to work out differ-
ences over the proposed legislation." 5 According to a Democratic
congressional aide, there was an "unwritten agreement" that the
Republicans' concerns would be discussed and that the Senate
would "go to the floor with amendments that address[ed those]
concerns" when the Senate returned from Easter recess on April 27,
1992.116 Conservative groups continued to exert pressure by
maintaining their assault against public broadcasting." 7 By mid-
May, Senate Democrats were reportedly close to accepting
Republican amendments and compromise wording in the bill."'
After being held up by conservative senators for seven months,
on June 3, 1992, the Senate rejected a Republican measure to
freeze government financing of CPB and voted to approve the
amended authorization bill." 9 The approved legislation was then
sent to a Senate-House conference committee to reconcile the
differences with the bill that had been approved by the House in
November, 1991.120 On August 4, 1992, by a voice vote with no
audible dissent, the House gave final congressional approval to the
beleaguered reauthorization bill;' 2' President George Bush signed
"5 See, e.g., Joyce Price, Democrats Seek Deal on Public Broadcast Funds,
WASH. TIMEs, Apr. 19, 1992, at A 11.
116 Id.
"' One chief piece of evidence offered by the conservative groups as proof
of the "liberal tilt" to PBS' programming was a study conducted by S. Robert
Lichter of the Center for Media and Public Affairs, an organization financed by
conservatives, that studied how the news media treat social and political issues.
See Private or Dark, supra note 96. Lichter, claiming to have studied all of the
prime-time public affairs documentaries aired on PBS for the 1987-88 television
season, concluded that "[t]he ideas expressed were far more consonant with the
beliefs and preferences of contemporary American liberals than those of
conservatives." See Private or Dark, supra note 96.
"8 Compromise, supra note 106.
"9 See Battle for Federal Money, supra note 94. The Senate rejected the
freeze proposal by a 75-to-22 vote, and approved the bill by a vote of 84-to-1I.
See Votes in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1992, at 41 (listing various
congressional votes).
0 See William J. Eaton, Senate Approves $1.1 Billion for Public
Broadcasting, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 1992, at A9.
21 See William J. Eaton, Broadcast Bill Ok'd By House, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
5, 1992, at Fl.
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the bill into law on August 27, 1992.122
Although Public Television supporters in Congress succeeded
in their attempts to continue funding the medium, the battle was
hard-won. The passed legislation contained several amendments
reflecting conservative concerns with the nature of programming on
Public Television. 123 These amendments were intended to inhibit
Public Television's airing of programs the conservatives did not
like. Additionally, the reauthorization battle was so overtly political
that it left many PBS executives dispirited and gloomy about the
future of the medium. 124 Conservative opposition made the role
of Public Television as an alternative to the commercial net-
works-and therefore, by nature, an adversary of those net-
works-a tenuous one.125
The fact that debates over Public Television's content have
often been coupled with arguments over whether the system should
be federally funded raises the question of whether the First
Amendment prevents Congress from dismantling Public Television
on the basis of its discontent with the programs the system
broadcasts. The following section examines the role that the First
Amendment can play in protecting Public Television from negative
congressional action based on the content of Public Television
programming.
22 See Bush Signs Bill Hiking Funding for Public TV, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27,
1992, at A22. The bill authorized $310 million for public television for fiscal
year 1994, $375 million for fiscal year 1995 and $425 million for fiscal year
1996. Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-356, 106 Stat. 951
(Aug. 26, 1992).
123 See, e.g., supra note 95 and accompanying text.
124 See Private or Dark, supra note 96.
.25 See Lean Left, supra note 104 (noting that Public Television's "very
existence is a rebuke to a profit-driven society").
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III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS A PROTECTION FOR PUBLIC
TELEVISION
The First Amendment recognizes, wisely, we think, that a
certain amount of expressive disorder not only is inevitable
in a society committed to individual freedom, but must
itself be protected if that freedom would survive.'26
I intend to see . .. every possible safeguard written into
the legislation necessary to assure complete freedom from
any Federal Government interference over program-
ming.12
7
How can the Federal Government provide a source of
funds to pay part of the cost of educational broadcasting
and not control the final product?
28
The federal government has the power to control that
which it subsidizes and experience shows that when the
federal government has that power, that power is eventu-
ally exercised. 129
In this section, this Article argues that the history and purpose
of the First Amendment, and the jurisprudence that sustains that
history and purpose, prevent Congress from discontinuing funding
Public Television on the basis of its programming content. After a
brief examination of the First Amendment's history, this Article
126 City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 472 (1987) (holding that
municipal ordinance making it unlawful to interrupt police officer in performance
of his duties was unconstitutionally overbroad under First Amendment).
127 Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. FCC, 521 F.2d at 293 n.19 (quoting remarks
of Sen. Pastore during Senate hearings on legislation that would eventually
become Public Broadcasting Act of 1967).
2" H. REP. No. 572, reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1805 (statement from
the Report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce).
129 Statement of Senator Strom Thurmond, quoted in EDWARD DE GRAZIA,
GIRLS LEAN BACK EVERYWHERE: THE LAW OF OBSCENITY AND THE ASSAULT
ON GENIUS 627 (1992).
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examines the nature of its applicability to the broadcasting medium,
and to public broadcasting in particular. This Article then raises and
answers the question of whether a decision on the part of Congress
to stop funding public broadcasting, based on its dissatisfaction
with the content of Public Television programming, could be
attacked and invalidated on First Amendment grounds. 3 ' This
question is especially pertinent in light of the battle-ridden history
of Public Television funding, and the widespread belief in Public
Television circles that what happened in 1991-92 could, and will,
happen again. 131
Although jurists and commentators have disagreed on the extent
to which the First Amendment should protect speech,1 2 most
130 Although others have focused on the role of the First Amendment with
regard to the actions of the CPB and PBS, see, e.g., Freeing Public
Broadcasting, supra note 80, this section focuses on congressional action,
because the actions of Congress can definitively be viewed as encompassed by
the First Amendment, and some question still exists as to whether CPB and PBS
are state actors. See Network Project v. Corporation for Pub. Broadcasting, 4
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2399 (D. D.C. 1979) (appellants alleged that CPB had
censored and controlled content of Public Television in contravention of the First
Amendment; court rejected appellants' claim finding that there was no state
action in public broadcasting structure and First Amendment was therefore
inapplicable). But see Freeing Public Broadcasting, supra note 80, at 724-27
(analysis leading to conclusion that CPB and PBS are state actors).
31 See Offensive Against Critics, supra note 99 (quoting PBS President
Bruce Christensen: "The inoculation for the disease has to come well before the
infection.").
"3 As Paul Stephan points out, "One would err to speak of [F]irst
[A]mendment doctrine as if a well-defined consensus existed about the principles
underlying [F]irst [A]mendment analysis." Paul B. Stephan, III, The First
Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203, 207 (1982) (noting
that neither Supreme Court nor scholars have developed comprehensive theory
of what guarantee means and how it should be applied). Justice Hugo Black, for
example, believed that the First Amendment guaranteed an absolute right. See,
e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting)
(stating that First Amendment's command to "make no law" literally means "no
law," "without any 'ifs,' 'buts,' or 'whereases"'). This absolutist position was
also taken by First Amendment theorists Alexander Meiklejohn and Thomas I.
Emerson. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961
SUP. CT. REv. 245 (1961); THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 17 (1970) (Emerson uses term "full protection" rather than absolute
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would agree that the purpose of the Amendment is to place a check
on the power of the government to control speech that it does not
protection; "[f]reedom of expression can flourish ... only if expression receives
full protection under the First Amendment. This is to say that expression must
be protected against governmental curtailment at all points . . ").
Such an absolutist position, however, has never been accepted by the
Supreme Court, and has been rejected by other jurists and First Amendment
theorists. See, e.g., Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976) (plurality opinion,
Brennan, J.) ("[T]he prohibition on encroachment of First Amendment
protections is not an absolute."); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 746 (1972)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (calling absolutism "simplistic and stultifying"); Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The
freedom to speak is not absolute . . . ."); MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
§ 2.01 (1984 & Supp. 1992) ("Absolutism simply will not wash .... [N]o one
can responsibly hold the position that the First Amendment is an absolute in the
sense that it literally protects all speech," citing punishments for perjury and
fraudulent statements, and antitrust laws as examples of restraints on the freedom
to speak).
Justice Felix Frankfurter, one of the most vehement opponents of the
absolutist position stated that the "literalness" of an absolutist position "treats the
words of the Constitution as though they were found on a piece of outworn
parchment instead of being words that have called into being a nation with a past
to be preserved for the future." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 521
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Two facts with regard to the absolutist view of the First Amendment should
be noted. First, even those jurists who rejected the absolutist position at times
flirted with the notion of the First Amendment as an absolute. See NIMMER,
supra, at § 2.01 n.5 (noting that Justice Douglas later "moved very close" to
Black's absolutist position; Justice Stewart occasionally considered absolutist
position); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 109 (1980)
(noting that Justices Black and Douglas claimed they were absolutists "though
Black more insistently than Douglas"). Second, as Melville Nimmer noted:
"[T]he absolutists when pushed are not all that absolute." NIMMER, supra, at
§ 2.01 n.6 (noting that Black, Meiklejohn, and Emerson all had limits to their
concepts of the amendment as an absolute mandate); see also ELY, supra, at 109
(noting that validity of absolutist approach must be faced head-on and it must be
recognized that "one simply cannot be granted a constitutional right to stand on
the steps of an inadequately guarded jail and urge a mob to lynch the prisoner
within").
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like.'33 The views on how and to what extent to do this, however,
vary widely.1
3 4
A. The First Amendment: A Historical Perspective
First Amendment theorist Melville Nimmer noted that "[iun the
beginning" all that existed were the words of the First Amendment
and very little else.'35 The drafters of the First Amendment left
no record of the intent behind the First Amendment.'36 The
congressional debate on the First Amendment merely assumed the
importance of the freedom of speech without making any attempt
to expound on just why such a freedom is important.'37
Commentators have been forced to guess at just what the
framers of the First Amendment had in mind when they chose the
language embodied therein. Leonard Levy asserts that the framers
intended that the language be read expansively: "The First
Amendment injunction, that there shall be no law abridging the
freedom of speech, was boldly stated if narrowly understood. The
bold statement, not the narrow understanding, was written into the
fundamental law .... What they said is far more important than
what they meant."'38 Therefore, any meaning given to the words
"' See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[A]bove all
else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.");
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
("Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, [the Framers]
amended the Constitution so that free speech.., should be guaranteed.").
In pertinent part, the First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
114 See supra note 132 and accompanying text; see also M. ETHAN KATSH,
THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW 164 (1989)
(noting lack of agreement about what First Amendment is supposed to do).
135 See NIMMER, supra note 132, at § 1.01.
136 See NIMMER, supra note 132, at § 1.01.
137 See NIMMER, supra note 132, at § 1.01.
138 See DANIEL L. FELDMAN, THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT:
APPLYING THE CONSTITUTION TO THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 183-84 (1990)
(quoting LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESs 348-49 (1985))
(emphasis added).
The ratifiers of the Amendment also engaged in very little debate regarding
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of the First Amendment has come through the gloss placed by the
judiciary during the last half century on what the framers said in
the First Amendment.1
39
Although judicial interpretation has not led to the application of
the First Amendment as an absolute mandate, 4 ° precedent does
support the view that the First Amendment exists to protect the
"free trade in ideas" in American society;' 4' to ensure that this
trade is-in Justice William Brennan's now classic
phrasing--"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"; 142 and to prevent
the government from censoring ideas which it finds objection-
able. 143 As Owen Fiss notes, the purpose of the First Amendment
is "to protect the ability of people, as a collectivity, to decide their
own fate."'14
4
the value of the freedoms meant to be protected by the First Amendment. Id.
Additionally, there is no remaining record of such debates. Id. In this regard,
John Hart Ely states: "[T]he only reliable evidence of what 'the ratifiers' thought
they were ratifying is the language of the provision they approved." ELY, supra
note 132, at 17.
131 See NIMMER, supra note 132, at § 1.01; see also FRED W. FRIENDLY,
THE GOOD Guys, THE BAD GuYs AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT xv (1976)
("[P]rior-restraint, freedom-of-the-press protections we live under are much more
the product of Holmes, Brandeis and Black than of Jefferson [or] Madison.").
4o See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
141 The notion of "free trade in ideas" comes from Justice Holmes's dissent
in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
142 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
143 See supra note 133 and accompanying text; see also Owen M. Fiss, Why
the State?, 100 HARv. L. REV. 781, 785 (1987) (stating that rule against content
regulation has favored position in First Amendment jurisprudence based on hope
that such a rule will produce broadest possible debate).
144 Fiss, supra note 143, at 786; see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union,
466 U.S. 485, 503-04 (1984) ("The First Amendment presupposes that the
freedom to speak one's mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty-and
thus a good unto itself-but also is essential to the common quest for truth and
the vitality of society as a whole."). This concept of the First Amendment is also
promoted by Meiklejohn. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH
AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); see also FELDMAN, supra
note 138, at 218 (noting that Meiklejohn believed that First Amendment's free
speech provisions should be understood in the context of American democracy
as a whole). This notion of the First Amendment finds its roots in the views of
James Madison, who stated, "A popular government without popular information
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On this basis, the First Amendment is perhaps the one widely
embraced limitation placed on governmental actions. 145 Yet this
warm reception of the First Amendment is based on the principle
of "freedom of speech" in the abstract.'46 As Melville Nimmer
wisely points out, "support for the right of any particular speaker
to exercise his right of free speech may drop away quickly among
those to whom the message conveyed is abhorrent."' 4 7 It as at
such a time that "all manner of rationalization as to why this
particular speech should not be permitted" will be heard.'48
Courts have faced the unenviable task of trying to navigate a
course that effectively interprets the First Amendment's command
and applies it to a constantly changing society. This task has
necessarily entailed the "fashion[ing of] ajurisprudence that permits
society to 'abridge' speech to the degree necessary to advance other
compelling interests.10
49
or the means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps
both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; and a people who mean to be
their own governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge
gives." KELLNER, supra note 38, at vii (quoting James Madison). Justice
Brandeis eloquently articulated this basis of support for the First Amendment in
his concurring decision in Whitney v. California:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the
state was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its
government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.
... They believed that ... the greatest menace to freedom is an inert
people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should
be a fundamental principal of American government.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
145 See Fiss, supra note 143, at 782-83 (noting "peculiar status" of free
speech in nation's constitutional scheme); see also NIMMER, supra note 132, at
§ 1.01 (noting that principle of freedom of speech "always has been and still is
warmly accepted by all strata of American society, and through virtually the
entire political spectrum").
146 See NIMMER, supra note 132, at § 1.01.
147 See NIMMER, supra note 132, at § 1.01. For example, expression that falls
within the confines of "fighting words," defamatory remarks, and obscenity has
been subject to lesser protection under the First Amendment than other forms of
expression. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 994 (12th ed. 1991).
148 NIMMER, supra note 132, at §1.01.
149 GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 60, at 309.
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Thus, the exigencies of the times have dictated the extent to
which, and the way in which, First Amendment ideals have been
applied. One example of how the application of the First
Amendment differs depending on the context in which it is applied
is the manner in which the Amendment has been applied to the
broadcasting medium.
I5 0
B. Applying the First Amendment to Broadcasting
1. Broadcasting, Generally
Broadcasting traditionally has received more limited First
Amendment protection than other media.'5' As Ithiel de Sola
0 On this point, see ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM
3-4 (1983):
The mystery is how the clear intent of the Constitution, so well and
strictly enforced in the domain of print, has been so neglected in the
electronic revolution. The answer lies partly in changes in the
prevailing concerns and historical circumstances from the time of the
founding fathers to the world of today; but it lies at least as much in
the failure of Congress and the courts to understand the character of
the new technologies. Judges and legislators have tried to fit technolog-
ical innovations under conventional legal concepts.
See also id. at 6-7:
The electronic transformation of the media occurs not in a vacuum but
in a specific historical and legal context .... [T]he law has rested on
a perception of technology that is sometimes accurate, often inaccurate,
and which changes slowly as technology changes fast. Each new
advance in the technology of communications disturbs a status quo.
... Compare, for example, the differing treatments of the press and the
broadcast media in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974) with Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). In
Tornillo, the Court struck down a Florida statute that required newspapers to
provide free reply space for political candidates who had been criticized in the
newspapers. 418 U.S. 241. Yet five years earlier, in RedLion, the Court upheld
a similar requirement for broadcasters. 395 U.S. 367 (upholding as constitutional
FCC's fairness doctrine which imposed affirmative duties of devoting a
significant amount of time to coverage of "controversial issues of public
importance" in a balanced manner and affording a reasonable opportunity overall
for presentation of significant contrasting or opposing viewpoints). Although, in
the words of one commentator, the complaints in the Tornillo and RedLion cases
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Pool once noted, "The principles of... the First Amendment have
been applied to broadcasting in only atrophied form." ' This
principle of different treatment was established by the U.S.
Supreme Court early in the evolution of the broadcasting indus-
try.'53 The Court accounted for the distinction in treatment by
reasoning that the unique characteristics of broadcasting,
particularly the limited availability of space on the broadcast spec-
trum,154 made governmental regulation of the medium a necessary
encroachment on the First Amendment's guarantee of free
speech.' Later decisions have followed this rationale to support
the imposition of limitations and conditions on broadcasting.
In Red Lion Broadcasting v Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC), 156 the Court affirmed the principle that
broadcasting was "a medium affected by a First Amendment
interest," yet still reached the conclusion that "differences in the
characteristics of new media justify differences in the First
were "almost mirror images of each other," the Tornillo Court never discussed
or even cited to the earlier Red Lion opinion. FRIENDLY, supra note 139, at 193.
Friendly notes that what these two seemingly contradictory decisions suggest, and
"what the Supreme Court assumes," is that newspapers and other printed media
are fully entitled to First Amendment protections, while the broadcast media are
not. FRIENDLY, supra note 139, at 197.
152 POOL, supra note 150, at 2.
153 See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
114 The critical characteristic differentiating the broadcast media from other
mediums is the limited number of frequencies over which broadcast signals may
travel. This physical limitation is known as "spectrum scarcity." See Benjamin
Marcus, Note, FCC v. League of Women Voters: Conditions on Federal Funding
That Inhibit Speech and Subject Matter Restrictions on Speech, 71 CORNELL L.
REV. 453, 457 (1986); L. Allyn Dixon, Jr., Note, Broadcasters'First Amendment
Rights: A New Approach?, 39 VAND. L. REV. 323, 326 (1986); see also POOL,
supra note 150, at 113-16 (1983). Pool believed that spectrum was actually "an
abundant source, but a squandered and misused one." See also POOL, supra note
150, at 151.
1 National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 226. The National Broadcasting
Court also recognized that the "public interest, convenience, or necessity"
standard implemented in granting broadcast licenses did not abridge or deny free
speech. Id. at 226-27; see FRIENDLY, supra note 139, at 195 (noting that focal
point of difference between Tornillo and Red Lion cases is scarcity argument).
116 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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Amendment standards applied to them."' 57 The Court also
recognized that although there were two sets of First Amendment
rights involved, those of the viewer and listener and those of the
broadcaster, it was the right of "the people as a whole.., to have
the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the
First Amendment" that was most important. 58
In Red Lion, the Court was called upon to determine the
constitutionality of the FCC's fairness doctrine.'59 The fairness
doctrine had become a part of statutory law after evolving over
years of broadcast regulation. 6 ° The fairness doctrine imposed
' Id. at 386. The Court stated, "Where there are substantially more
individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle
to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the
right of every individual to speak, write, or publish." Id. at 388. The impact of
the Red Lion Court's pronouncements make it a landmark case in the history of
broadcasting law. See FRIENDLY, supra note 139, at xiv. For a comprehensive
tracing of the effect of Red Lion, see generally FRIENDLY, supra note 139.
158 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390. The Court stated: "It is the right of the
viewers and the listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."
Id
9 In United States v. Radio Television News Directors Association
("RTNDA'), a case consolidated with Red Lion, the Court was also asked to
review the FCC's promulgation of the personal attack and political editorializing
regulations which were put in place by the FCC after the Red Lion litigation had
begun. Id. at 371. Briefly, the personal attack regulations provided for licensee
notification, within a reasonable time, of a person or group whose "honesty,
character, integrity or like personal qualities" were attacked during the
presentation of views on a controversial issue of public importance. Id. at 373.
The licensee was also required to offer the attacked group or individual a
reasonable opportunity to respond over the licensee's facilities. Id at 374. The
regulation did not apply to "bona fide newscasts, bona fide news interviews, and
on-the-spot coverage of a bona fide news event." Id The political editorializing
regulation provided that after endorsing or opposing a legally qualified candidate
in an editorial, a licensee had to transmit to either the other qualified candidate
or the candidate opposed in the editorial notification of the date and time of the
editorial, a script or tape of the editorial, and an offer of a reasonable opportunity
for the candidate or a spokesman for the candidate to respond over the licensee's
facilities within 24 hours after the editorial. Id. at 374-75.
.60 See Dixon, supra note 154, at 326. The fairness doctrine was first
articulated in In re Editorializing By Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1257-
58 (1949). It was later codified into law by the 1959 amendments to the
Communications Act. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a). See HENRY GELLER, THE FAIRNESS
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two affirmative duties on broadcasters. The first, known as the
"Part One requirement," compelled broadcast licensees to devote a
"reasonable amount" of their programming to controversial issues
of public importance; the second part required that when such
issues are aired, contrasting viewpoints must be presented in order
to provide a reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting
views on issues relevant to the public.' 6' It is the latter require-
ment that is more often thought of when the "fairness doctrine" is
discussed.'62
Those who opposed the doctrine argued that it had a chilling
effect on the decisions made by broadcast programmers.163 A
broadcaster who wished to avoid later controversy and the need to
justify a broadcast's "fairness" would be inhibited from airing
especially strong presentations. 64 A broadcaster with minimal
DOCTRINE IN BROADCASTING: PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED COURSES OF ACTION
2 (1973). For a history of the fairness doctrine, see FRIENDLY, supra note 139,
at 12-3 1. In 1987, the FCC concluded that continued enforcement of the fairness
doctrine was contrary to the First Amendment. GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 60,
at 324; MARVIN R. BENSMAN, BROADCAST/CABLE REGULATION 99 (1990). The
doctrine was declared to have a chilling effect on the First Amendment rights of
broadcasters. See GUNTHER, supra note 147, at 1352 n.2.
161 See RICHARD E. LABUNSKI, THE FIRST AMENDMENT UNDER SIEGE: THE
POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 15 (1981); see also FRIENDLY, supra note
139, at 13; GELLER, supra note 160, at v, 2.
In the words of the Red Lion Court, under the doctrine a broadcaster was
required to "give adequate coverage to public issues" and coverage had to be
"fair in that it accurately reflects the opposing views." Red Lion, 395 U.S. at
377. As articulated in later opinions, the doctrine applied whenever a broadcaster
presented one side "of a controversial issue of public importance." In re
Accuracy in Media, Inc., 45 F.C.C.2d 297, 299 (1973).
162 LABUNSKI, supra note 161, at 15-16, 17; GELLER, supra note 160, at 2
n.t (calling second requirement "essence of the fairness doctrine"). For a further
discussion of the fairness doctrine, see R. TERRY ELLMORE, BROADCASTING LAW
AND REGULATION 207-17 (1982).
163 See GELLER, supra note 160, at 5. Geller quotes newsman Walter
Cronkite with regard to the impact of fairness complaints: "It is only natural that
station management should become timid, and newsmen should sidestep
controversial subjects rather than face the annoyance of such harassment." See
GELLER, supra note 160, at 5 n.*.
164 See GELLER, supra note 160, at 4. This argument was presented by the
broadcaster in Red Lion. Roger Robb, who argued the case for the broadcaster
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resources could be forced to either cut down on or completely
avoid airing controversial programming because any resulting
fairness conflict could drain limited financial resources. 165 Many
broadcasters argued that, in essence, the fairness doctrine inevitably
made a government agency akin to a "super editor" with the power
to inhibit the sort of vigorous debate that the First Amendment
intended to promote.
66
The FCC's position on the matter is easily stated: a responsible
broadcaster could present truly controversial programming without
fear of reprisal by the government, and have wide discretion to
present whatever programming he deemed to be controversial in a
vigorous manner with no need for balance in any specific pro-
gram. 167 Additionally, a broadcaster who acted in good faith
would neither be fined nor endanger his license; he would simply
be required to present additional speech to rectify the imbalance in
programming. 68 Therefore, the fairness doctrine was not antithet-
ical to the goals of the First Amendment, but rather promoted and
furthered those goals. 69
The Red Lion Court found the FCC's reasoning more persua-
sive than the argument that the doctrine had a chilling effect on
cautioned that if the Court gave approval to the doctrine, the broadcaster would
"in the future ... tread more cautiously." See FRIENDLY, supra note 139, at 62
(quoting Robb's oral argument). The end result of this, argued Robb, would
amount to censorship "nonetheless virulent for being self-imposed." FRIENDLY,
supra note 139, at 62.
165 See GELLER, supra note 160, at 4-5. The petitioner in Red Lion made this
argument as well, stating that it was a station of modest circumstances and for
a small station in a competitive market "any donation of free time ... is not a
trivial concern, and might very well drive the station out of existence." See
FRIENDLY, supra note 139, at 62 (quoting Red Lion attorney Roger Robb)
(omission in original). Robb noted that the threat of a fine could have "a chilling
and deterrent effect upon ... Red Lion's First Amendment right." Id. (omission
in original).
166 GELLER, supra note 160, at 4.
167 See GELLER, supra note 160, at 5.
168 GELLER, supra note 160, at 5.
169 See GELLER, supra note 160, at 5 (stating FCC's position that doctrine
never prevents any speech, but only adds more voices or views to the robust
debate).
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broadcasters' speech. 70 In a unanimous opinion authored by
Justice Byron White,' 7' the Court held that the specific applica-
tion of the fairness doctrine in Red Lion and the promulgation of
the regulations in Radio Television News Directors Association
were valid and constitutional.'72 The Court, echoing the argu-
ments in favor of the fairness doctrine, stated that the doctrine and
the regulations "enhance[d] rather than abridge[d] the freedoms of
speech and press protected by the First Amendment."' 73
In making its pronouncement, the Court supported a First
Amendment standard for broadcasting that was different from that
applied to other media. This standard, although not specifically
articulated,'74 clearly offered broadcasters a lesser degree of
protection than that offered newspapers in the Tornillo deci-
sion. 75 According to the Court, this lesser standard of First
Amendment protection was justified by the limited nature of the
broadcasting resource. 176
First noting that broadcasting was "clearly a medium affected
by a First Amendment interest,"'77 the opinion went on to state
that "differences in the characteristics of new media justify
170 The Court noted that it would certainly be "a serious matter" if the FCC
requirements induced self-censorship on the part of licensees and had the effect
of making their coverage of controversial public issues "ineffective," yet
dismissed these results as only a speculative possibility. Red Lion v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 393 (1969).
17' The opinion in RedLion was unanimous by a 7-0 vote due to Justice Abe
Fortas's departure from the Court and to Justice William 0. Douglas's absence
during the oral argument of the case. One commentator noted that Douglas, a
strong opponent of the fairness doctrine on First Amendment grounds, "never
quite [forgave] himself' for missing Red Lion. See FRIENDLY, supra note 139,
at 138.
172 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 375.
173 id.
171 One group of commentators notes that the Court's different standard of
First Amendment protection for broadcasting is not clearly stated. See GINSBURG
ET AL., supra note 60, at 350.
171 See supra note 151 and accompanying text; see also GINSBURG ET AL.,
supra note 60, at 350.
176 See infra notes 177-180 and accompanying text.
177 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386.
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differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them.""17
Justice White wrote: "[T]he First Amendment confers... no right
to an unconditional monopoly of a scarce resource which the
Government has denied others the right to use." '179 He continued,
"There is no sanctuary in the First Amendment for unlimited
private censorship operating in a medium not open to all." 8' In
perhaps the most startling statement in the opinion with regard to
the First Amendment protections offered broadcasters, Justice
White stated:
It does not violate the First Amendment to treat licensees
given the privilege of using scarce radio frequencies as
proxies for the entire community, obligated to give suitable
time and attention to matters of great public concern. To
condition the granting or renewal of licenses on a willing-
ness to present representative community views on contro-
versial issues is consistent with the ends and purposes of
those constitutional provisions forbidding the abridgement
of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.' 8'
Therefore, based on the assertion that the scarcity of the
broadcast spectrum made the broadcast medium fundamentally
different from other media, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
restrictions on broadcasters that would be impermissible if imposed
on those who sought to communicate either through the print
medium or through the simple spoken word not broadcast on the
air. 82 Whereas in the 1950s "the fairness doctrine" was a little-
thought-of FCC guideline that could be dismissed as mere "law-
yer's language,"'83 the Red Lion case brought the doctrine to the
forefront of the communications industry and allowed the Supreme
Court to cement the less-protected nature of the broadcast medium.
As one commentator notes, Red Lion became "a code word for
government interference with freedom of the press."' 84
178 Id.
7 Id. at 391.
"0 Id. at 392.
181 Id. at 394.
182 See GUNTHER, supra note 147, at 1500.
183 FRIENDLY, supra note 139, at 13.
184 FRIENDLY, supra note 139, at 5.
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Five years later, in CBS, Inc. v Democratic National Committee
("DNC"),I85 the curtailed First Amendment protection afforded
the broadcasting medium was reiterated. Again, the limited nature
of the medium's protection was based on the scarcity of the
broadcasting resource, and therefore, found its support in Red Lion
as precedent. Although the Supreme Court's decision in DNC
began and ended with Red Lion, 8 6 as one commentator noted, the
Court's decision in Red Lion was as distinct from its decision in
DNC as two cases involving the fairness doctrine could be." 7
Where Red Lion dealt with one individual's right to airtime to
answer a personal attack against him and with the right of a station
to deny the federal government's order to grant the individual the
time to respond, DNC concerned an entire organization's right of
access to the airwaves and the right of a broadcaster to reject the
purchase of time for such an organization. 18
The issue presented in DNC was "whether a broadcast
185 412 U.S. 94 (1973). As in Red Lion, two cases were consolidated under
one heading in Columbia Broadcast System ("CBS') v. Democratic National
Committee. In one instance, the Business Executives' Move for Peace ("BEM"),
an anti-Vietnam War group brought suit against a single station for its refusal to
air the group's messages against the war. Id. at 98; see FRIENDLY, supra note
139, at 121-22. In the other case, brought by the Democratic National Committee
("DNC") against the entire broadcasting industry, the committee protested the
industry's refusal to allow it either free airtime or purchased airtime to counter
President Richard Nixon's effective use of the broadcast media to further his and
the Republican Party's agenda. See DNC, 412 U.S. at 127 n.21.
Depending on the nature of their involvement, those who played a part in
the case refer to it by different names. The Washington Post-Newsweek stations
and the Business Executives' Move for Peace call it BEM; the Democrats and the
lawyers who argued the case for the Democratic National Committee refer to the
case as DNC; the CBS lawyers remember the case as CBS. FRIENDLY, supra note
139, at 134 n.'. Because the Supreme Court joined the cases under the
Democratic National Committee's name, the case shall be referred to in this
Article as DNC.
186 See FRIENDLY, supra note 139, at 135 (noting that opinion quoted Red
Lion in first paragraph and referred to Red Lion in last paragraph). Additionally,
notes Friendly, in between these opening and closing mentions there were 38
other mentions of Red Lion. FRIENDLY, supra note 139, at 135.
187 FRIENDLY, supra note 139, at 135.
188 FRIENDLY, supra note 139, at 135.
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licensee's general policy of not selling advertising time to in-
dividuals or groups wishing to speak out on issues they consider
important" violated the First Amendment.'89 Writing for the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Judge Skelly Wright had
reversed a prior FCC decision, stating that "a flat ban on paid
public issue announcements is in violation of the First Amendment"
and holding that an arbitrary ban on the sale of time for discussion
of public issues offended First Amendment principles. 9 ' Amid a
flurry of opinions, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the lower
court's decision with the Court's majority position on most issues
stated by Chief Justice Warren Burger.' 9
Burger wrote an opinion that served as a "mixed blessing to the
broadcaster" because it not only recognized that "Congress intended
to permit private broadcasting to develop with the widest journalis-
tic freedom consistent with its public obligations,"'' 92 it also, in
effect, repositioned the much-disparaged fairness doctrine as a
protector of the broadcast industry, rather than as a threat to the
industry's freedom.'93 Burger's opinion "used the [f]airness
[d]octrine as a shield to protect radio and television from access by
political advertisers" and "as a sword to prevent broadcasters from
engaging in one-sided presentations on public issues."' 9 4
The chief justice noted that the FCC had made admirable
attempts to stay out of the editorial process and that a constitutional
right of access would inevitably lead the FCC to review the
189 DNC, 412 U.S. at 97. The Court was also asked to consider whether such
action violated the Federal Communications Act of 1934. Id.
190 BEM v. FCC; DNC v. Federal Communications Commission, 450 F.2d
642, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1971), quoted in CBS v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94 (1973); see also
FRIENDLY, supra note 139, at 134.
'91 The Court's reversal of the lower court's decision raised so many
questions that it required five different opinions-four of them simply to explain
the reasoning of the main opinion. FRIENDLY, supra note 139, at 135 (in addition
to the opinion penned by Burger, Justices Douglas, Stewart, White and Blackmun
wrote concurrences and Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion).
192 DNC, 412 U.S. at 110.
193 See FRIENDLY, supra note 139, at 137 (noting that CBS's president relied
on fairness doctrine in arguing against BEM's right to access, yet would later
attack doctrine as unconstitutional).
194 FRIENDLY, supra note 139, at 141.
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day-to-day editorial decisions made by broadcasters.' Instead of
this undesirable result, Burger stated, it should be up to the
broadcaster to use his "significant journalistic discretion in deciding
how to best fulfill the [f]airness [d]octrine obligations."' 96 In
other words, the fairness doctrine did not grant across-the-board
access, but instead placed the principal responsibility on broadcast-
ers to ensure fair coverage. 97 The Burger opinion appeared to
reject First Amendment-based arguments in favor of the fairness
doctrine. In fact, some commentators have questioned whether the
Burger opinion ever truly reached the constitutional question
presented.'98
Although the stance on the constitutional issue is murky with
regard to exactly how much support the Court intended to offer
broadcasters, what is clear is that Burger based his opinion on the
status of broadcasting as different from other media. At the
beginning of his opinion, Burger noted--citing Red Lion-that
because "the broadcast media pose unique and special problems not
present in the traditional free speech case," the Court was required
to "afford great weight to the decisions of Congress and the
experience of the [FCC]" in evaluating the First Amendment claim
presented in the case.' 99 Later in his opinion, he discussed the
inherent differences between privately owned newspapers and
publicly regulated broadcast stations: "A broadcast licensee has a
large measure of journalistic freedom but not as large as that
exercised by a newspaper. A licensee must balance what it might
prefer to do as a private entrepreneur with what it is required to do
as a 'public trustee.' 20
0
Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, articulated a far
195 DNC, 412 U.S. at 127 ("Regimenting broadcasters is too radical a therapy
for the ailment respondents complain of.").
196 Id. at 111.
1' See THE MEDIA AND THE LAW 32 (Howard Simons & Joseph A.
Califano, Jr. eds., 1976).
'9' See, e.g., GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 60, at 342 (asking whether there
is any majority holding on constitutional issue and noting Justice Brennan's
suggestion that there was no majority holding on constitutional issue).
199 DNC, 412 U.S. at 102.
200 Id. at 117-18.
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clearer and firmer constitutional position in favor of broadcasting.
Although in agreement on the Court's decision to reverse the lower
court, Douglas denounced Burger's contention that newspapers
enjoyed protections not available to the electronic media and
concluded that "TV and radio stand in the same protected position
under the First Amendment as do newspapers and magazines. 20 1
He then went even further and offered an attack on the fairness
doctrine stating, "The [f]airness [d]octrine has no place in our First
Amendment regime. It puts the head of the camel inside the tent
and enables administration after administration to toy with TV or
radio in order to serve its sordid or its benevolent ends., 20 2
The DNC opinion is confusing because with all of its differing
conclusions, it is difficult to tell exactly what sort of First
Amendment protections the Court is offering broadcasters. What
one does take away from the Court's opinion is that broadcasting,
due to the scarce nature of the broadcast spectrum, is subject to a
different level of constitutional scrutiny than other forms of
media.203 This different level of scrutiny left the door open for
the Court to revert to the First Amendment analysis of Red Lion.2 °4
20' Id. at 148; see also FRIENDLY, supra note 139, at 138.
202 DNC, 412 U.S. at 154.
203 Professor Tribe notes that DNC remained "firmly in the Red Lion
tradition" through its refusal to consider that scarce channels could be allocated
in the same manner as newspapers as opposed to a manner incorporating
government involvement and broadcaster autonomy. LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-25 (2d ed. 1988) (footnote omitted).
204 In fact, this is arguably what the Court did in its 1981 decision, CBS, Inc.
v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981). In CBS, the Court faced the issue of whether
broadcasters could be required to grant access to third parties, an issue strikingly
similar to the issue explored eight years earlier in DNC. Yet, in allowing a right
of access in CBS, the Court distinguished the DNC decision by stating that it was
not approving "a general right of access to the media" but was instead supporting
"a limited right to 'reasonable' access that pertains only to legally qualified
federal candidates and may be invoked by them only for the purpose of
advancing their candidacies once a campaign has commenced." Id. at 396 (CBS
dealt with the legitimacy of § 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act of 1934,
which allowed the FCC to revoke any station license for the "willful or repeated
failure to allow reasonable access" to legally qualified candidates on behalf of
their candidacies for elective office). By upholding the statute in question in CBS
and disagreeing with the petitioners' argument that the statute violated the First
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The Court's standard of First Amendment protection for
broadcasting is not explicitly set forth in any of its fairness doctrine
decisions. Yet, although the Court's messages in Red Lion, DNC,
and CBS appear to be mixed, one thing is clear: the U.S. Supreme
Court supported a different application of the First Amendment to
the broadcast medium than to other media, and this difference
stemmed from the nature of the broadcast medium as a scarce
resource which was not available to all. Due to the limited nature
of the broadcast resource, the award of a license by the FCC was
seen as the granting of a public trust, thereby making the broad-
caster a public trustee; this role as a public trustee necessitated that
the government regulate the broadcasting industry in some
manner.
205
This view of broadcasting leads to the question of whether
public broadcasting should be treated any differently than other
forms of broadcasting in light of its even more evident role as "a
public trust." In 1984, the Supreme Court explored this issue.
2. Public Broadcasting
In FCC v League of Women Voters,216 the Supreme Court
addressed the constitutionality of section 399 of the Public
Broadcasting Act.2 °7 This section restricted the ability of noncom-
mercial broadcasting stations which received grants from the CPB
Amendment rights of broadcasters by "unduly circumscribing their editorial
discretion," Id. at 394, the Court again sanctioned government interference with
broadcasting based on the scarcity of broadcast resources. The Court relied on
Red Lion, stating that the broadcasters' rights under the First Amendment were
not violated because "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right
of the broadcaster, which is paramount." Id. at 395, quoting, 395 U.S. at 390.
Interestingly, after stating in DNC that Red Lion did not confer a First
Amendment right of access for editorial advertisements, Chief Justice Burger
wrote the majority opinion in CBS.
205 See supra note 200 and accompanying text; see also KEN AULETTA,
THREE BLIND MICE 19-20 (1992) (noting that nature of television as public trust
was illustrated by fact that frequencies were relatively scarce and had to be
rationed, therefore necessitating government-imposed regulations).
206 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
207 47 U.S.C. § 399 (1988).
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to engage in editorializing. 28  Additionally, no such
noncommercial broadcasting station could support or oppose any
candidate for public office. 2 9 The reasoning behind Congress's
enactment of this statute was that as a part of the broadcasting
medium that received funds from the federal government, noncom-
mercial broadcasters had to be prevented from becoming "propa-
ganda organs for the government."2 0
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court,2 1' reviewed the stan-
dard the Court had developed for the broadcasting medium in
previous cases. He recognized that "because broadcast regulation
involves unique considerations," the Court had not followed exactly
the same approach that it had with other media and had never gone
so far as to demand that regulation of the broadcast medium serve
a compelling governmental interest.212 The Court noted three
208 Id. The term "editorializing" was not defined in the statute which merely
stated that stations could not "engage in editorializing." See FCC v. League of
Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 366 (1984). Yet the FCC construed the statute to
apply to "the use of noncommercial educational broadcast facilities by licensees,
their management, or those speaking on their behalf for the propagation of the
licensee's own views on public issues . . . ." Id. at 381 (citing Accuracy in
Media, Inc., 45 F.C.C. 2d 297, 302 (1973)). Apparently, the term was not meant
to include the presentation of opinions by those persons not mentioned by the
FCC. See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 381 (citing Accuracy in Media,
Inc., 45 F.C.C.2d 297, 302 (1973) ("Such prohibition should not be construed to
inhibit any other presentations on controversial issues of public importance.")).
209 47 U.S.C. § 399.
210 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 372.
2. Justice Brennan had penned the dissent in DNC.
212 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 376. In making this determination,
Brennan corrected the standard that had been applied by the lower court. See
League of Women Voters, 547 F. Supp. 379, 384 (C.D. Cal. 1982). The lower
court applied the compelling interest standard, the standard traditionally applied
to statutes that restrict the discussion of public issues outside of the broadcasting
context. See id. The lower court's application of this standard could have resulted
from confusion over the Supreme Court's prior broadcasting decisions regarding
the standard to be applied. In fact, this is just what the government contended
when the case reached the Supreme Court. In arguing that a less demanding
standard of review than the compelling interest standard was required, the
government asserted that the lower court "drew the wrong lessons" from the
Supreme Court's prior decisions concerning broadcast regulation. League of
Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 375.
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"fundamental principles that [had guided its] evaluation of broad-
cast regulation. 2 13 First, the Court had long recognized that
Congress, acting under the authority of the Commerce Clause, has
the power to regulate "the use of this scarce and valuable national
resource." '214 Second, the Court noted, citing its decisions in Red
Lion21 5 and DNC,21 6 that because of the scarce nature of the
broadcasting resource, Congress could, in the exercise of its power,
"seek to assure that the public receives through this medium a
balanced presentation of information on issues of public importance
that otherwise might not be addressed if control of the medium
were left entirely in the hands of those who own and operate
broadcasting stations. '217 Third, the Court stated that while it had
in prior decisions taken note of the fact that the government's
interest in ensuring balanced coverage of public issues was both an
"important and substantial" interest, it had also previously made
clear that "broadcasters are engaged in a vital and independent form
of communicative activity., 218 Hence, the First Amendment "must
inform and give shape" to the ways in which Congress flexed its
The lower court's opinion had taken notice of the fact that the Supreme
Court's prior decisions regarding the First Amendment and broadcasting had
noted that the "special characteristics" of the broadcast medium justified the
application of a less stringent standard of review. League of Women Voters, 547
F. Supp. at 384. Apparently, however, the lower court misinterpreted this pro-
nouncement, as evidenced by its recognition that the FCC had not specifically
brought any special characteristics of the broadcast media to the court's attention
that would warrant the application of a lesser standard of review. Id. Because the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence takes the "special characteristics" of the broadcast
medium as a given, a specific articulation of the special characteristics of the
broadcast medium is not necessary. See discussion supra notes 177-181, 199-200
and accompanying text.
213 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 376.
214 Id.
215 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
216 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
217 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 377. The Court reiterated its
previously articulated view that differences in the broadcast medium, namely
spectrum scarcity, justified differences in the First Amendment standard applied
to the medium versus other media. Id. (quoting Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
368 (1969)).
21" League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 378.
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regulatory muscle in the broadcasting area.2" 9 In sum, the League
of Women Voters Court recognized that "although the broadcasting
industry plainly operates under restraints not imposed upon other
media, the thrust of these restrictions has generally been to secure
the public's First Amendment interest in receiving a balanced
presentation of views on diverse matters of public concern."2 In
-articulating the fundamental principles applicable to broadcasting,
the Court rejected the lower court's "compelling" interest test in
favor of an examination of whether the restriction proposed by
section 399 was "narrowly tailored to further a substantial govern-
ment interest."22'
The Court found section 399 to be unconstitutional in two
respects. First, Justice Brennan's opinion noted that the restriction
imposed by section 399 was specifically directed at a form of
speech--expression of editorial opinion--"that lies at the heart of
First Amendment protection." '222 Brennan's next quarrel with
section 399 was based on the statute's scope. The scope of section
399's ban, stated Brennan, was delimited solely by the content of
the speech to be suppressed. 23 Brennan based this finding on the
fact that "a wide variety of non-editorial speech" was plainly not
prohibited by the statute.224 Consequently, in order to ascertain
whether a particular statement constituted an editorial proscribed by
29 Id. The Court, citing to CBS and its quotation of language from DNC,
recognized that broadcasters are "entitled under the First Amendment to exercise
'the widest journalistic freedom consistent with their public [duties]."' Id. at 378
(alteration in original).
220 Id. at 380.
221 Id. The Court, citing Red Lion, CBS and DNC, recognized that
"ensur[ing] adequate and balanced coverage of public issues" was a substantial
government interest. Id.
222 Id. at 381 ("Expression on public issues has always rested on the highest
rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values") (citation omitted). Brennan
recognizedthat § 399 restricted"preciselythat form of speech which the Framers
of the Bill of Rights were most anxious to protect-speech that is 'indispensable
to the discovery and spread of political truth."' Id. at 383.
223 Id. at 383.
224 Id. Brennan cited daily announcements of a station's program schedule
and over-the-air appeals for listener contributions as examples of speech
permissible under § 399. Id.
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section 399, it would be necessary to examine the content of the
message to determine whether it involved "controversial issues of
public importance." '225 This clearly amounted to "[a] regulation
of speech ... motivated by nothing more than a desire to curtail
expression of a particular point of view on controversial issues of
general interest" and was thereby "the purest example of a 'law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.'
226
The Court was careful to note that it was not holding that
Congress or the FCC were without power to regulate "the content,
timing, or character of speech" by noncommercial broadcasters.2 7
What the Court did hold in League of Women Voters was only that
"the specific interests sought to be advanced by section 399's ban
on editorializing are either not sufficiently substantial or are not
served in a sufficiently limited manner to justify the substantial
abridgement of important journalistic freedoms which the First
Amendment jealously protects. 221
In most respects, the public broadcasting medium was not
distinguished from the broadcast medium in general. The Court
reasserted the broadcast medium's different nature as compared to
other media and restated the existence of a different standard of
First Amendment protection based on the nature of the broadcast
medium.229 However, public broadcasting is different from
225 Id. The Court analogized the editorializing ban to the actions of the New
York Public Service Commission that were declared unconstitutional in
Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 530 (1980)
(holding that an order prohibiting inclusion in monthly bills of inserts discussing
controversial public policy issues directly infringed freedom of speech under First
and Fourteenth Amendments).
226 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 383-84 (quoting Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 546 (1980)).
227 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 402.
228 Id. The Court left the ban against supporting or opposing candidates for
public office intact. This ban exists today at 47 U.S.C. § 399.
229 It is important to note, however, that Justice Brennan's opinion, although
continuing to recognize the spectrum scarcity doctrine, left the door open to
jettisoning it. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 376 n. 11 ("The prevailing
rationale for broadcast regulation based on spectrum scarcity has come under
increasing criticism in recent years. Critics ... charge that with the advent of
cable and satellite television technology, communities now have access to such
a wide variety of stations that the scarcity doctrine is obsolete."). Yet, Brennan
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general broadcasting because unlike general broadcasting, public
broadcasting is subsidized by the federal government. The Court
took notice of this fundamental difference in addressing the
government's arguments in support of section 399. The government
advanced three arguments in defense of the statute. It first argued
that section 399 ensured that the federal government, through its
supply of funding, would not be able to undermine the autonomy
of broadcasters and thereby turn them into "vehicles for
Government propagandizing. '2 3' The government claimed that the
power of the purse could lead noncommercial broadcasters to either
say what the government instructed them to say, or more likely, to
say what they thought would please the government.2 3 ' The
government next argued that section 399 was necessary to prevent
noncommercial broadcasting stations from becoming outlets for the
"partisan viewpoints" of private interest groups or for the "political
and ideological opinions of station owners. '232 The government
argued that "the hazards posed in the 'special' circumstances of
noncommercial educational broadcasting are so great that section
399 is an indispensable means of preserving the public's First
Amendment interests., 233
The Court rejected the government's first two arguments out of
hand. It countered the government's first argument by stating that
other provisions of the Public Broadcasting Act-for example the
creation of the CPB-already protected the noncommercial
broadcasting medium from governmental interference. 234 The
Court then disposed of the government's second contention finding
that section 399 was both underinclusive and overinclusive with
noted that it was not up to the Court to take such action, but rather such a
decision was best left to either Congress or the FCC. Id. ("We are not prepared
... to reconsider our longstanding approach without some signal from Congress
or the FCC that technological developments have advanced so far that some
revision of the system of broadcast regulation may be required.").
230 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 384; see also Marcus, supra note
154, at 463.
231 See Marcus, supra note 154, at 463.
232 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 385; Marcus, supra note 154, at
463. 233 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 385.
234 Id. at 386-90.
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respect to the government's concern that stations could become an
outlet for the views of a privileged few.235 With regard to the
statute being underinclusive, the Court found that to the extent the
statute failed to prevent biased programming and to the extent that
little was done to preclude a broadcaster from distorting his
programming to communicate his own personal views, section 399
was underinclusive 6 Section 399 was found to be overinclusive
based on the fact that other regulations existed-for example, the
fairness doctrine-which offered protection against the actions
Congress sought to restrict through its enactment of section
399.237 Unlike the fairness doctrine, which the League of Women
Voters Court asserted added "more speech" to the public forum,
section 399 "simply silence[d] all editorial speech" by noncommer-
cial broadcasters. 8 Therefore, "the breadth of [section] 399
extend[ed] so far beyond what is necessary to accomplish the goals
intended by the Government, it fail[ed] to satisfy the First
Amendment standards" that had previously been applied in the area
of broadcasting.239
The government's third contention, although also rejected by
the Court, proves to be the most potentially troubling for an
argument that a decision on the part of Congress to defund Public
Television would violate the First Amendment. The government's
third argument was that by prohibiting CPB-funded stations from
editorializing, Congress was merely choosing not to subsidize
noncommercial broadcasters' editorials.240 The government based
this assertion on the Supreme Court's prior ruling in Regan v
Taxation With Representation of Washington ("TWR"),24' where
the Court had held that Congress in the exercise of its spending
power could reasonably refuse to subsidize the lobbying activities
of tax-exempt charitable organizations by prohibiting such organi-
zations from using tax-deductible contributions to fund their
235 Id. at 396.
236 Id. at 396-97; Marcus, supra note 154, at 464.
237 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 397-99.
238 Id. at 398.
239 Id. at 398.
240 Id. at 399; Marcus, supra note 154, at 463.
241 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
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activities. 2 Although the majority opinion in League of Women
Voters distinguished TWR by noting that in that case the Internal
Revenue Code sections provided for the creation of two distinct
tax-exempt entities, 2"' while section 399 provided no such choice
and a noncommercial broadcaster was unable to segregate its
editorializing activities from its other activities,244 in his dissent,
Justice Rehnquist accepted the logic of TWR as applied to noncom-
mercial broadcasting.245
Justice Rehnquist, who had authored the Court's unanimous
opinion in TWR, relied on the case to argue that the connection
between federal funding and the restrictions of section 399 made
the restrictions permissible. He asserted that in enacting section
399, Congress had simply made a determination that public funds
would not be used to subsidize noncommercial broadcasting
stations that engaged in editorializing.246 In support of his asser-
tion, Rehnquist stated, "I do not believe that anything in the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents Congress
from choosing to spend public moneys in [this] manner., 247
Rehnquist based his opinion on the Congress' authority as the
242 Id, at 548-51.
243 The two entities were divided into one entity that does not lobby and
thereby can receive tax-deductible contributions, and one that does lobby and is
ineligible to receive such contributions. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at
400.
244 Id. (noting that station that receives as little as one percent of its overall
income from CPB would be barred absolutely from all editorializing and would
have no way of limiting use of its federal funds to all noneditorializing activities
and would be barred from using wholly private funds to finance editorial
activity). In rejectingthe government's proposition, the Court prevented Congress
from using its spending power to limit free expression. See Marcus, supra note
154, at 453. The First Amendment rights of public broadcasters trumped the
exercise of the congressional spending power.
The Court noted, however, that if § 399 were revised to provide for the
creation by noncommercial broadcasters of affiliate organizations which could
use station facilities to editorialize with nonfederal funds, such a statute would
be valid under the reasoning of TWR. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 400.
245 Justice Rehnquist was joined in his dissent by Justice White and Chief
Justice Burger.
246 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 403.
247 Id.
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governmental voice of the people. He found that Congress had
rationally determined that the bulk of taxpayers whose moneys
provide the funds for CPB grants would prefer not to see the
management of local noncommercial broadcast stations promulgate
its own private views on the air at taxpayer expense.248
Discussing the Court's decision in TWR, Rehnquist noted that
the Court had "squarely rejected the contention that Congress'
decision not to subsidize lobbying violates the First Amendment"
even though the Court had recognized that the right to lobby is
constitutionally protected. 249 For Rehnquist, TWR stands for the
proposition that "a legislature's decision not to subsidize the
exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right."25
Yet, he noted:
This is not to say that the Government may attach any
condition to its largesse; it is only to say that when the
Government is simply exercising its power to allocate its
own public funds, we need only find that the condition
imposed has a rational relationship to Congress' purpose
in providing the subsidy .... 2.
In the case of section 399, Congress' prohibition was directly
related to its purpose for subsidizing public broadcasting, stated
Rehnquist. 2 2 Additionally, Congress' prohibition was neutral in
24 Id. at 405. Justice Brennan rejectedthis reasoning in the Court's majority
opinion, noting that it was readily disposed of by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976). As the Court explained in that case, "[V]irtually every congressional
appropriation will to some extent involve a use of public money as to which
some taxpayers will object." League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 385 n.16.
(citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91-92). Yet this does not mean that disgruntled
taxpayers have "a constitutionally protected right to enjoin such expenditures.
Nor can this interest be invoked to justify a congressional decision to suppress
speech." League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 385 n.16.
249 League of Women Voters, 468 U'.S. at 405.
250 Id. See Regan v. TWR, 461 U.S. 540, 545 ("This Court has never held
that Congress must grant a benefit such as TWR claims here to a person who
wishes to exercise a constitutional right.")
21 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 407 (emphasis added).
252 Id. at 407. Additionally, in TWR, Rehnquist cited to Commissioner v.
Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958) for the proposition that appropriations are like
the tax exemptions and deductions at issue in TWR in that they were "a matter
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that it did not affect editorials of only one ideological bent, but all
editorials." 3
Because TWR represents the decision of a unanimous Court that
the government does not have to fund what it does not wish to
fund and that the First Amendment does not protect against such
decisions, Rehnquist's support of TWR in League of Women Voters,
and the TWR case standing on its own, are potentially troubling for
an argument that a congressional decision to defund Public
Television would violate the First Amendment. Yet, the Court's
reasoning in TWR leaves open a door to making a successful
argument in favor of the maintenance of Public Television.
The Court's decision in TWR was premised on its earlier
decision in Cammarano v United States,254 where the Court had
upheld a U.S. Treasury Regulation that denied business expense
deductions for lobbying activities.2 15 Yet, in Cammarano, Justice
Douglas, in a concurring opinion, clarified the difference between
a decision not to subsidize protected activity and the levying of a
penalty based on the exercise of constitutional rights.256 For
example, if a decision were made simply not to subsidize lobbying
activities, such a decision would be constitutionally sound; yet, if
a tax deduction were denied based on the taxpayer spending money
to influence legislation, this would be a penalty levelled on First
Amendment activity and therefore unconstitutional.257
Although there appears to be a fine line between the two
actions noted by Justice Douglas, an argument could be made that,
at this point, and based on the history of the public broadcasting
medium, particularly the most recent debates over reauthorization,
a decision to defund Public Television would amount to a penalty
of grace [that] Congress can, of course, disallow ... as it chooses." TWR, 461
U.S. at 549.
253 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 407. The neutral prohibition would
allow the Court to apply the rational relationship test to § 399, as opposed to the
more stringent test that would be necessary if the prohibition were determined
to be content-based.
254 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
25 TWR, 461 U.S. at 546; see also Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513.
256 Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 515.
257 Id.; see also Marcus, supra note 154, at 468.
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imposed on action protected by the First Amendment. That is, any
such decision to defund would most likely be grounded in the
belief that Public Television is too ideologically liberal.258 Public
broadcasters fear for their survival based on the tone of the most
recent reauthorization debates, 259 and this fear could force a
choice on the part of the noncommercial broadcast licensee to
choose between federal support and the exercise of a fundamental
right. While the Constitution does not compel the government to
subsidize the exercise of all fundamental rights (as the Court
recognized in TWR), it must prevent the government from penaliz-
ing the exercise of a fundamental right through a denial of funding.
Particular language in TWR leaves open the possibility that a
statute repealing the Public Broadcasting Act would violate the
First Amendment. Relying on Cammarano, the Court noted that
TWR's case would be different "if Congress were to discriminate
invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to 'ai[m] at the
suppression of dangerous ideas."' 26 Arguably, a repeal of the
Public Broadcasting Act based on the content of Public Television
programming viewed as liberally-biased could have the goal of
suppressing ideas which a particular political party finds "danger-
ous."
Based on the Court's decision in League of Women Voters, it
appears that although Public Television is subject to the same lesser
standard of First Amendment protection as other forms of broad-
casting, at the same time, due to its nature as a federally subsidized
part of the broadcast media, it could arguably receive a different
kind of First Amendment protection from governmental interfer-
ence. Whether this different First Amendment standard would be
that articulated by Justice Brennan in the majority opinion in
League of Women Voters-that is, a rejection of the proposition
that Congress needs only a rational basis and an apparently
28 See supra notes 103-114 and accompanying text.
259 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
260 TWR, 461 U.S. at 548 (quoting, Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513 (quoting
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958))). Additionally, the Court quotes
from its opinion in Maher v. Roe: "Constitutional concerns are greatest when the
State attempts to impose its will by force of law ... ." TWR, 432 U.S. 464, 476
(1977) (considering legislative decisions not to subsidize abortions).
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innocuous purpose for placing conditions that inhibit free expres-
sion on the receipt of federal funding-or the standard offered by
Justice Rehnquist-that "a legislature's decision not to subsidize the
exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right"26"-is
unclear. Yet, a case recently decided by a California federal district
court may offer additional support to the argument that a congres-
sional decision to defund Public Television may be subject to
reversal based on First Amendment principles.
In Finley v National Endowment for the Arts,262 the district
court examined the constitutionality of the National Endowment for
the Arts' ("NEA") 263 decision to defund the work of several
performance artists. The case arose from the artists' application for
grants under the NEA's Performance Arts Program during a period
261 FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 405 (1984) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
262 795 F. Supp. 1457 (C.D. Cal. 1992). The Justice Department appealed
this decision to the Ninth Circuit. See Martin Booe, What Does the NEA Mean
by 'Decency'? Justice Department Challenges Agency's Standard for Arts
Funding, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1994, at C2. As of this writing, the court's
decision is pending.
263 The NEA was created by Congress in 1965 as part of the National
Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities. Pub. L. No. 89-209 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. § 954 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). See Finley, 795 F. Supp.
at 1460. It was the intent of Congress to encourage "free inquiry and expression"
and to insure that "conformity for its own sake" was not encouraged and that "no
undue preference should be given to any particular style or school of thought or
expression." Id. at 1460 (citation omitted). The NEA is authorized to administer
a grants-in-aid program for individuals of "exceptional talent" engaged in or
concemedwith the arts. 20 U.S.C. § 954(c). The NEA administers grants through
its chairperson and a 26 member council, all of whom are appointed by the
president with the advice and consent of the Senate. 20 U.S.C. §§ 954(b)(1),
955(b). Although the chairperson is the ultimate decision maker, she is prohibited
from either approving or disapproving any grant application until she has
received the recommendation of the council on the application. 20 U.S.C.
§ 955(0. Jane Alexander is the current chairperson of the NEA; at the time
period relevant to the Finley case, John Frohnmayer was the chairperson of the
NEA.
For a history of the NEA, see Craig Alford Masback, Note, Independence
vs. Accountability: Correcting the Structural Defects in the National Endowment
for the Arts, 10 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 177 (1992) [hereinafter Structural
Defects].
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when the NEA was under political fire.
From 1989 through the time period when Finley was decided,
the NEA had been the target of both congressional critics and
private interest groups who excoriated the organization for
providing funding for works that depicted, among other things,
sexual acts and expressions of women's anger over male dominance
in the area of sexuality.
264
Despite the turbulent atmosphere at the NEA, the applications
of the plaintiffs in Finley were reviewed by the Performance Artists
Program Peer Review Panel (the "Panel") along with those of over
eighty other applicants. 265 The Panel unanimously recommended
that the plaintiffs' applications be funded, which as a matter of
practice and custom was tantamount to the granting of an applica-
tion by the council and the NEA chairperson. 66
After the Panel had recommended that the plaintiffs' applica-
tions be funded, the NEA chairperson asked the panel to reconsider
its recommendations regarding three of the plaintiffs; he decided
that reconsideration of the fourth plaintiff's (Karen Finley)
application was unnecessary since "two of his close friends had
attended a Finley show and had reported to him that it was not
obscene.'267 After reconsideration, the Panel again recommended
that the three artists' applications be funded. 268 Before the council
264 See Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1461; DE GRAZIA, supra note 129, at 622-
688; Owen M. Fiss, State Activism and State Censorship, 100 YALE L.J. 2087,
2089-97 (1991) [hereinafter State Activism]. Two especially prominent attacks
were levelled in the Spring of 1989 upon the discovery that NEA funding had
been provided for a photography exhibit by Robert Mapplethorpe which included
homoerotic imagery, and an exhibit by Andres Serrano entitled Piss Christ,
which depicted a crucifix emersed in a container of the artist's urine. See Finley,
795 F. Supp. at 1461; State Activism, supra, at 208 (noting that Senator Jesse
Helms described one of Mapplethorpe's photographs as a picture of "a naked
man with a bullwhip protruding from his posterior"); DE GRAZIA, supra note
129, at 630 (noting that Helms called Serrano "not an artist" but "a jerk";
Senator Alphonse D'Amato "vilified the NEA's action in supporting Serrano's
work, which he described as 'garbage"'); Structural Defects, supra note 263, at
178 (noting extensive debate provoked by Mapplethorpe's and Serrano's works).
265 Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1462.
266 Id. at 1462 n.9.
267 Id. at 1462.
268 Id.
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met to review the recommended NEA grants, a Washington, D.C.
newspaper reported that Frohnmayer had been "advised" by
"friends of the NEA" to veto several grants, including Finley's, in
order to "ease President Bush's deepening troubles with conserva-
tives on his suspect cultural agenda. 2 69 Subsequently, the NEA
advised the plaintiffs that their applications had been denied.27°
The plaintiffs in Finley brought suit on the basis that the NEA and
Frohnmayer injured their First Amendment interests by denying
their applications because of the content of their past artistic
expression. 27' They sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the
basis of the NEAs denial of their applications for funding.272
The issue in Finley was whether the plaintiffs could even allege
that the defendants had injured their First Amendment rights
through their denial of the plaintiffs' applications based on the
plaintiffs' past artistic expression. 273 Asserting that the plaintiffs
could not make such an allegation, the defendants sought judgment
on the pleadings. 274
The defendants offered an argument strikingly similar to that
supported by Justice Rehnquist in TWR and League of Women
Voters, contending that the denial of the plaintiffs' grant applica-
tions did not amount to an injury of their First Amendment rights
because the denial was merely a refusal to subsidize the plaintiffs'
expressive activities and not a barrier to that exercise. 275 The
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 1463. The individual plaintiffs, as well as the National Association
of Artists' Organizations, asserted an alternative First Amendment claim
regarding whether the First Amendment protects artistic expression funded by the
federal government. Id. at 1472-73. This claim is not addressed here because in
light of Supreme Court precedent regarding broadcasting, a right of First
Amendment protection for broadcasting does not have to be established. See
supra note 177 and accompanying text. Additionally, this section of this Article
is concerned more with arguments that could be made with regard to the denial
of funding for Public Television. The First Amendment claim based on the denial
of funding to the NEA applicants is therefore more relevant.
272 Finley, 795 F. Supp. at 1460.
273 Id. at 1463.
274 Id. at 1460.
275 Id. at 1463.
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district court rejected this argument, relying on Speiser v Randall:
[E]ven though a person has no "right" to a valuable
governmental benefit and even though the government may
deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are
some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It
may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes
his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his
interest in freedom of speech ... 276
The court noted that the defendants correctly argued that the
denial of a benefit imposes an unconstitutional condition only when
the benefit is imposed as a penalty for constitutionally protected
speech, yet that they were incorrect in claiming that this standard
did not apply to the case at bar.277 The fact that the plaintiffs
alleged that their applications were denied based on the content of
their past performances, indicated a penalty imposed for past
speech.27 ' Therefore, the plaintiffs stated a sufficient claim under
the First Amendment and the defendants were not entitled to
judgment on the pleadings.279
By analogy, the decision in Finley lends further support to an
argument that a content-based congressional decision to defund
Public Television could be attacked under the First Amendment.
Yet, the ultimate result of such an attack is by no means certain. A
court could find that such a claim would be governed by TWR and
that because Public Television receives funding from sources other
than Congress, there is no First Amendment danger involved in
Congress' decision to withdraw funding for Public Television. The
better solution is, therefore, to derive an alternative means of
funding the medium.
IV AN ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FUNDING PUBLIC TELEVISION
Although League of Women Voters in conjunction with
precedent stemming from the NEA controversy indicates that the
276 Id. at 1463 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
277 Id. at 1463.




First Amendment could protect against the termination of Public
Television's funding stemming from a congressional, content-based
attack, such a result is by no means certain.2"' For this reason,
prophylactic measures designed to ensure the continued existence
of Public Television are necessary. As the discussion above
illustrates,28' the wisest course is to examine alternative means of
funding the medium.
Although various alternative funding schemes for Public
Television have been presented throughout the span of its exis-
tence,"' including the Carnegie Commission's original proposal
280 See discussion supra notes 240-261 and accompanying text.
281 As the 1991-92 authorization process confirms, President Ford's belief
that multiyear funding was "a constructive approach to the sensitive relationship
between federal funding and freedom of expression" and would "assure the
independence of noncommercial... television programming for our nation" was
ill-founded. See GIBSON, supra note 3, at 215 (quoting President Ford).
282 For example, before deciding on the multiyear funding scheme in 1975,
several alternatives were contemplated by Congress. Among these alternatives
were: setting aside a portion of income tax paid by commercial radio and
television stations and cable operations; a tax on commercial advertising and
cable advertising revenues; a dedicated excise tax on residential electric and
telephone bills; proceeds from the profits of operating a domestic satellite
system; a "user charge" paid by families owning radio and television sets; a
Public Broadcasting Development Board financed by the sale of bonds; and
federal loan guarantees. See GIBSON, supra note 3, at 215.
Another suggestion is that a spectrum-use fee be imposed on all commercial
broadcasters; such a fee would go directly to CPB thereby eliminating the
government control inherent in the appropriations process, providing "a steady,
nonfederal source of funding for public broadcasting." See Freeing Public
Broadcasting, supra note 80, at 746-47. The justification for imposing this fee
is that the users of the spectrum-a public resource-should pay for the use of
the spectrum. Freeing Public Broadcasting, supra note 80, at 746. A similar
proposal was recently offered by Henry Morgenthau who based his suggestion
on the Clinton administration's proposal to open up a large segment of the
airwaves now largely reserved for the military. See Morgenthau, supra note 4.
A major aspect of the Clinton administration's plan is that for the first time
frequencies usually "given away" by the FCC would be auctioned off to the
highest bidder. Morgenthau, supra note 4. In light of this shift, Morgenthau
suggests that some of the yield from such an auction could be put toward
financing public broadcasting. Morgenthau, supra note 4. Morgenthau predicts
that the profit from such an auction would be in the billions of dollars.
Morgenthau, supra note 4.
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that the system be funded through an excise tax on television
sets,283 this section shall offer a different proposal. This section
offers a proposal for providing funding for Public Television
through a direct federal matching grant program based on direct
taxpayer contributions. This matching grant program would be
supplemented by direct taxpayer contributions at the state level.
A. Giving the Public Its Say, Part ." Current Actions
Any arguments made in favor of preserving Public Television
naturally presume that Public Television is worth saving. How best
to assess the correctness of this presumption? The Republicans who
added the amendments to the Act reauthorizing funding for Public
Television believed that the determination should be made by those
for whom the medium was created-the public. To this end, they
amended the Public Broadcasting Act to provide for CPB's
solicitation of the views of the public and for the provision of
"reasonable opportunity" for members of the public to present
comments to the CPB Board regarding "the quality, diversity,
creativity, excellence, innovation, objectivity, and balance" of the
programming offered by Public Television.2"
Public Television, prodded by a congressional mandate and
realizing that it would be unwise to bite the hand that feeds it,
implemented various mechanisms for determining the public's
views on Public Television programming. In addition to an "open
to the public" project, town meetings, and planned workshops on
editorial integrity,2"5 the CPB Board, in an attempt to hear and
heed the voices of the viewing public, initiated a toll-free number
for viewers who wished to respond to programming.2 6 Yet these
283 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
284 Pub. L. No. 102-356, § 19, 106 Stat. 955 (1992) (amending 47 U.S.C.
§ 396).
285 See Richard W. Carlson, Letter to the Editor, How Broadcast Agency
Continues to Guard the Public Interest, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1993, at 18 (author
is president and chief executive officer of CPB in Washington, D.C.); Sandy
Tolan, Dial 1-800-Censor, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1993, at 31.
286 See Tolan, supra note 285, at 31. Public Television viewers who call
what is referred to as the Comment Line (1-800-356-2626), are asked if they
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proposals have led some observers to worry about "town meeting"
audiences packed with members of special interest groups, and the
use of the toll-free number as a censorship tool.
287
How, then, can the level of interest in Public Television and the
desire to continue funding it through the federal government be
assessed without fear of content regulation on the part of special
interest groups who might attempt to impose their own sense of
morality on others? This Article suggests that Congress enact a
statute similar to the one that created the Presidential Election
Campaign Fund.
B. Giving the Public Its Say, Part II: Use of the Tax Form
and Matching Grants
In 1966, Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC")
through its enactment of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund
Act of 1966 ("PECFA").288 The PECFA provided that every
individual, other than a nonresident alien, whose income tax
liability for any taxable year exceeded one dollar could designate
that one dollar be paid over to the Presidential Campaign Fund (the
"Fund") for the account of candidates running for the offices of
president and vice president of the United States. 28 9 Taxpayers
have comments about a specific program or about Public Television program-
ming in general. The operator then takes the caller's name, address, and
telephone number and asks how the caller came to hear about the Comment Line.
Telephone call to the Comment Line (Feb. 28, 1994).
287 See, e.g., Tolan, supra note 285, at 31 (noting CPB's statement that
"[n]egative comments might vindicate a station's decision not to carry
controversial programming."). But see Carlson, supra note 285, at 18 (stating that
solicitation of public comments is not "censorious" but "democratic").
288 The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act ("PECFA") is now
codified, as amended, at 26 U.S.C. § 6096 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
289 26 U.S.C. § 6096(a). In the case of a joint return of a husband and wife
with a tax liability of two dollars or more, each spouse could designate that one
dollar be contributed to the fund. Id. The PECFA was amended in 1993, raising
the level of the contribution individual and joint return filers could make to the
fund. The PECFA now states that individuals whose income tax liability is three
dollars or more, and spouses filing joint returns with a tax liability of six dollars
or more, can designate three dollars (in the case of spouses, three dollars each)
for the Presidential Election Campaign Fund. 26 U.S.C. § 6096(a).
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indicate their desire to designate moneys for the Fund by checking
a box on their federal income tax return.290
The means for setting aside the funds designated for candidates
is set forth in another provision of the IRC.29' The statute estab-
lishes on the books of the U.S. Treasury a "special fund to be
known as the 'Presidential Election Campaign Fund.' ' 292 In this
provision, the Secretary of the Treasury is mandated to, "from time
to time," transfer to the fund an amount "not in excess of the sum
of the amounts designated (subsequent to the previous presidential
election) to the fund" under section 6096.293 The statute provides
for the appropriation to the fund for each fiscal year, out of
amounts in the general fund of the Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, an amount equal to the amounts designated under
section 6096 during each fiscal year.294
In 1991, over 29 million Americans (17.7% of taxpayers) contributed
through the tax dollar check-off. Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes,
Campaign Finance Reform: A key to restoring the Health of our Democracy, 94
COLUM. L. REv 1126, 1151 (1994). In 1992, approximately 19% of taxpayers
used the check-off to contribute. John W. Mashek, 1996 Election Fund May Run
Short as Only 19% of Taxpayers Check off, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 15, 1992, at
10.
290 26 U.S.C. § 6096(c)(2). The taxpayer is asked either on the first page of
her return or on the page bearing her signature: "Do you want $3 to go to this
fund?," and "If a joint return, does your spouse want $3 to go to this fund?"
Income Tax Return for Single and Joint Filers With No Dependents (Form
1040EZ) (1993).
29' 26 U.S.C. § 9006(a) (1988).
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 Id. The constitutionality of the designation of the Fund was challenged
on First and Fifth Amendment grounds, yet the U.S. Supreme Court, in Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), upheld the constitutionality of the funding scheme.
Both the dollar check-off provision and the appropriation provision were
attacked. The Court found that the check-off provision was not unconstitutional
for failing to permit taxpayers to designate particular candidates or parties as
recipients of their money, and that the appropriations provision was not rendered
any less an appropriation by Congress merely because the amount of the
appropriation was determined by reference to aggregates of one- and two-dollar
authorizations on taxpayers' income tax returns. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
91 (1976). See Lisa Babish Forbes, Note, Federal Election Regulation and the
States: An Analysis of the Minnesota and New Hampshire Attempts to Regulate
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Although there is a projected shortfall in the system,295 this
shortfall developed primarily because the dollar tax check-off was
not indexed to inflation.296 If the dollar tax check-off had been
indexed, there would not have been a funding shortfall, and in fact,
the fund might have maintained a surplus.297
While opponents of the use of a dollar tax check-off scheme to
fund Public Television could point to the Fund's projected shortfall
as an indication of the potential failure of the scheme on the basis
of a lack of taxpayer support, the fact is that there would be no
funding problem with regard to the Fund that was created by the
PECFA if the check-off had been indexed to inflation.298 There-
fore, a similar scheme created for the purpose of funding Public
Television should be indexed to inflation to counter any potential
shortfall problems.
At the local level, states have enacted legislation creating
taxpayer contribution-based funds that provide monies for various
projects. For example, the State of Connecticut enacted legislation
in 1993 which provided for the creation of three separate accounts
within a general fund to be supported by taxpayer contributions in
amounts designated on state tax return forms.299
Unlike PECFA, the Connecticut legislation did not create a
separate matching fund from which monies would be collected.
Instead, the amount designated by each taxpayer on her tax form
is deducted form the taxpayer's state tax refund. 30 Additionally,
Congressional Elections, 42 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REv 509, 539-41 (1992).
295 See Mashek, supra note 289 (noting shortfall in funding program).
296 See Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 289, at 1142 n.89.
297 Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 289, at 1142 n.89.
298 Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 289, at 1142 n.89 (cause of shortfall
is failure to index to inflation as opposed to a decrease in percentage of taxpayers
who check off).
299 Public Act No. 93-233 (1993). The legislation created an organ transplant
fund account, an endangered species, natural area preserves and watchable
wildlife account, and an AIDS research education fund account. See Public Act
No. 93-233, §§ 2(a), 4(a), 6(a). These accounts were established as separate,
nonlapsing accounts within the general fund. Id.
300 See Public Act No. 93-233, §§ l(b), 1(c) (creating space on tax return
form where taxpayer can indicate intention to contribute and stating that
contributed amount shall be deducted from tax refund).
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under the Connecticut legislation, the separate accounts are
authorized to receive additional monies from public and private
sources, as well as from the federal government.3 °'
Similar legislation could be enacted in all fifty states to provide
a source of funding for Public Television at the local level,
supplementing the funds received from the federal government.
The tax form could therefore be used to fund Public Television
at two levels. First, at the federal level, Congress could pass an act
similar to PECFA which would create a Public Television
Matching Fund. Each federal taxpayer who wished to do so could
then contribute a statutorily designated amount toward funding
Public Television by checking off the appropriate box on her tax
form. Second, at the local level, states could create accounts funded
by designated portions of taxpayers' state tax refunds as indicated
by the appropriately checked box on the state tax form. As with the
Connecticut scheme, these accounts would be authorized to receive
supplemental monies from public and private sources as well.
The use of general tax revenues for funding Public Television
in this manner would afford members of the public the opportunity
to express their desire to maintain the public broadcasting medium,
but would not allow them the opportunity to dictate its content.3 °2
Although the federal government would remain a source of
funding, there would be a check on Congress' ability to affect the
status of Public Television on the basis of congressmembers'
discontent with the content of Public Television programming. The
taxpayers, through the use of the check-off on the tax form, would
be visibly expressing their desire to see the medium continue. With
a significant public expression of the wish to preserve Public
Television, Congress would have a difficult time arguing that the
people should not pay for something they do not want. The people
will have spoken.
31 See Public Act No. 93-233, §2(a).
302 Cf Question: Should the Government Fund the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting?, U.S.A. TODAY, Mar, 5, 1992, at 8A ("person on the street"
opinion poll of six members of the public, all stating that government should
continue funding; one interviewee stated view that only programs with a non-




When the Act creating Public Television was originally
proposed, Congress recognized that federal financial assistance
"should in no way involve the Government in programming or
program judgments. An independent entity supported by federal
funds is required to provide programs free of political pres-
sures."'303 The current funding scheme allows Congress to frus-
trate both the mandate of CPB and the goals of Public Television.
Any failure on the part of Public Television to offer "programs of
high quality, diversity, creativity, excellence, and innovation""3 4
stems in large part from the method by which it is funded. °5
The tenor of the 1991-92 congressional reauthorization debates
for Public Television disturbingly mirrors the Nixon
administration's attempts to destroy the public broadcasting system
in its early years. The same argument made during the Nixon era,
namely that Public Television programming is too liberal in
content, found its way to the Senate floor and infected the Public
Broadcasting Act in the guise of compromise amendments passed
in order to get the reauthorization bill through Congress.
As the history of Public Television and the recent furor
illustrate, despite attempts to insulate Public Television from
control by the federal government, the current funding system still
does not fully protect Public Television from governmental
influence of the worst kind-defunding of the medium on the basis
of the content of its programming. Arguably, a statute enacted by
Congress which repealed the Public Broadcasting Act could be
attacked on First Amendment grounds, yet any such attack would
have to overcome at least two obstacles. First, it would be
necessary to prove that Congress took action based on the content
303 S. REP. No. 222, reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1775 (emphasis added).
304 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A).
305 The insecure nature of federal funding leads public broadcasting stations
to seek funds from other various sources, many of whom affect the tone of
Public Television programming. See, e.g., KELLNER, supra note 38, at 184-85
(noting effect of contributions from oil companies on Public Television
programming).
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of the programming on Public Television. Second, and perhaps a
more difficult hindrance to surmount, existing precedent supporting
the view that the government does not have to provide funding for
particular activities if it does not choose to do so would have to be
convincingly defused.
Based on the difficulty of clearing these hurdles, the most
viable means of ensuring the future of Public Television is to
devise a new means of funding the medium. A direct federal
matching grant program based on direct taxpayer contributions,
similar in nature to the statutorily created Presidential Campaign
Fund, is one alternative means of providing funding for Public
Television substantially free from congressional interference.
Although the possibility would still exist that Congress could repeal
a statute creating such a program, just as it could repeal the Public
Broadcasting Act, such an action would be more difficult to justify
since the funding apparatus involved in the proposed scheme would
take account of the public's desire to maintain the Public Television
system. If, through its use of the tax form, the public expressed a
desire to see Public Television continue, it would be difficult for
Congress as the governmental representative of the people to act
against the populace's clearly-expressed wishes.
Perhaps this proposal would prove unworkable, yet an explora-
tion of its feasibility would at least open the floor to debate on the
perilous nature of the current funding system and to further
suggestions as to how Public Television can be safely preserved
through a new funding scheme. Until such an inquiry is seriously
undertaken, the fate of Public Television shall remain shamefully
uncertain.
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